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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1
While there has been a tremendous amount of literature on how Unemployment Insurance (UI)
affects unemployed workers’ job search behavior, there has been no previous study on how the
health insurance premium subsidy affects this behavior. To fill the gap in previous studies, this
paper analyzes the impact of the substantial federal health insurance premium subsidy on
unemployment duration, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
To begin this study, I detail the history of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA) of 1985 that was established to help keep unemployed workers insured. Furthermore,
in order to help unemployed individuals reduce the cost of getting insurance, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided a 65% health insurance premium
subsidy for workers who lost their jobs involuntarily and elected to take up COBRA coverage.
The extended unemployment duration resulting from this premium subsidy is equivalent to the
effect of increasing Unemployment Insurance benefits by 56 percent which is equal to $168 per
week. In order to identify the subsidy effect on the duration of unemployment, this paper
compares the unemployment duration of two different unemployed cohorts who lost their jobs
just before and after the end of subsidy eligibility. This study sheds light on the unemployed
workers’ job search behaviors during the Great Recession and finds that the COBRA premium
subsidy causes unemployed workers to significantly increase their unemployment duration by
2.11 months. The empirical results are consistent with the predictions of job search theory.
Therefore, these estimates imply that the COBRA premium subsidy is having an important
impact on the unemployed workers’ job transition behavior.

Chapter 2
This paper analyzes the impact of the Employer Sponsored Insurance (ESI) expansion, part of
the 2006 Massachusetts health reform, on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
participation decisions. I exploit the variation across SSDI beneficiaries among married couples
to identify the causal effect of the reform. I find that for spouses without ESI, the positive effect
of the ESI expansion on SSDI participation is 0.98 percentage points stronger than it is for
spouses with ESI. These estimates imply that spouses without ESI increases SSDI beneficiaries
by 0.0429% (i.e., the 10.73% of total SSDI beneficiaries increase in Massachusetts after the
reform) and is associated with higher SSDI beneficiaries. Moreover, my estimates imply an
elasticity of spouses without ESI with respect to SSDI beneficiaries of 0.0913. The calculations
suggest that the health reform was more expensive than it might first appear because of an
increase in SSDI expenditure.

Chapter 3
This paper analyzes the impact of the Medicaid expansion, part of the 2006 Massachusetts health
reform, on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation decisions. I exploit the variation
across SSI-disabled applicants to identify the causal effect of the reform on the SSI claim rate.
My estimates imply that the reform reduces SSI-disabled claims by 0.098% (i.e., the 11.66% of
total claims in 2008 in Massachusetts) and is associated with a lower initial SSI claim. These
estimates also imply Medicaid-disabled expenditure can save around 1% by attending to small
inefficiencies in the current program. However, the calculations suggest that the health reform
was not as expensive as it might first appear because of reductions in SSI expenditure.
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Chapter 1.The Impact of the COBRA Premium Subsidy on the Duration of Unemployment:
Evidence from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)

1. Introduction
In the U.S., most group health insurance is closely tied to employment. As a result, those who are
separated from employment generally go uninsured because insurance is both more expensive
and less generous in individual insurance markets. This low rate of insurance coverage among
the unemployed has brought considerable public policy debate over interventions in insurance
markets to increase health insurance access for the non-employed (Gruber and Madrian, 1997).
To help keep unemployed workers insured, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 requires most employers to offer coverage to former
employees for up to 18 months after job termination. However, the COBRA insurance usage rate
has been modest because the COBRA costs employees 102 percent of their pre-termination
health insurance premium, i.e., the entire premium plus up to 2 percent more for administrative
expenses (so employers don’t need to share the premium costs). Consequently, many are unable
to afford to pay the full premium after their job loss (Lambrew, 2001).
The extent of job loss during the Great Recession was severe and unforeseen; according
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment rate climbed up to 9-10 percent between
2009 and 2011. In order to help unemployed individuals reduce the cost of getting insurance, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of February 2009 gave a 65 percent health
insurance premium subsidy to workers who lost their jobs involuntarily between September 2008
and May 2010, to enable them to continue coverage for up to 15 months through their former
employers’ plans. The subsidy substantially reduced the cost of health insurance after job loss;
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on average, the subsidy amount is about $816 per month for family coverage and $294 per
month for single coverage.1
However, some studies have found that any intervention by the government to protect the
unemployed may distort the employment behavior of unemployed workers (Gruber and Madrian,
1997). Employees do pay for the cost of health insurance, either explicitly through employee
premiums or implicitly through lower wages when they are working. After individuals become
unemployed they start to pay the full cost of health insurance premiums. The ARRA health
insurance premium subsidy was designed to subsidize the 65 percent of the full cost of health
insurance for the unemployed. This large subsidy could have a direct and immediate impact on
unemployed workers by decreasing their job search efforts, and hence contributing to longer
unemployment durations.
While there has been a considerable amount of literature on how Unemployment
Insurance (UI) affects the unemployed workers’ job search behavior, to the best of my
knowledge, there has been no previous study on how the health insurance premium subsidy
affects unemployed workers’ job search behavior. This study is among the first to estimate the
impact of the COBRA premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment. I estimate the
relationship between the COBRA premium subsidy and unemployment duration by analyzing
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the nationally representative
panel study of households.
This paper focuses on one hypothesis; based on job search theory, the substantial health
insurance premium subsidy will cause the COBRA premium subsidy-eligible unemployed
individuals to have longer unemployed spells than the COBRA premium subsidy-ineligible

1

These numbers are based on average monthly premiums for employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) in 2011 $1256 for family
coverage and $452 for single coverage (Kaiser/HRET, 2012).
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unemployed individuals. The job search theory states that reducing the cost of being unemployed
will increase an individual’s expected duration of unemployment (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976).
I hypothesize that a premium subsidy would encourage unemployed workers to decrease their
job search efforts, thereby contributing to an extension of the duration of their unemployment.
I identify the subsidy effect by the following procedures. First, I re-organize the data into
one observation per individual and construct the unemployed cohort by identifying the workers
who lost their jobs involuntarily during a particular month. Next, I trace each unemployed
individual until he or she obtains his/her first paid job and calculate the duration of
unemployment (i.e., how many months they spend on their job search).2 Finally, I document the
effect of the premium subsidy on the labor market outcome by comparing the unemployment
duration of two different unemployed cohorts who lost their jobs involuntarily just before and
after the end of subsidy eligibility.
After analyzing the data, I find that the COBRA premium subsidy-eligible unemployed
workers are predicted to significantly increase their unemployment duration by 2.11 months,
conditional on underlying factors influencing their individual preferences for insurance and
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. The extended unemployment duration resulting from the
premium subsidy is equivalent to the effect of increasing UI benefits by 56 percent which is
equal to $168 per week. This is contrary to Gruber and Madrian (1997), who found that the
COBRA has little effect on the duration of unemployment. Two reasons may potentially explain
why my study results in different findings. First, the period covered by Gruber and Madrian’s
study was almost twenty years ago (1983-1989), before the COBRA premium subsidy was

2

If the unemployed only find a unpaid job through the whole panel, the duration will be recorded at the point when they find a
job.
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available. Second, their study limited the focus to prime-aged (25-54 years old) males, while this
paper studies the whole sample population.3
The rest of this paper is laid out in six sections. After giving the background on the
ARRA COBRA subsidy in section 2, section 3 discusses the theoretical prediction between the
COBRA premium subsidy and the unemployment duration. The data and empirical strategy are
summarized in section 4. Section 5 presents the results while section 6 discusses the implications
in terms of UI. Section 7 concludes.

2. Background
The COBRA of 1985 offers former employees (and their qualified dependents), who terminate
employment for reasons other than gross misconduct, the opportunity to purchase EmployerSponsored Insurance from their former employers after their employment ends, at a premium not
exceeding 102 percent (i.e., entire premium and 2 percent for administrative costs) of the group
rate. The COBRA requires employers with 20 or more employees to make health insurance
coverage available for up to 18 months after job termination. Many states have extended these
provisions to small businesses of 2-19 employees (NCSL, 2009).4 Employers are required to
provide a notice of eligibility for a health plan to ex-workers within 30 days, and the insurance
plans must send an election notice within 90 days after the job termination. A former employee
has 60 days to elect this coverage from the date the notice was sent (Internal Revenue Service

3

In SIPP, the labor force status recorded the people who are aged 15 or more.
During the subsidy period, two states expanded COBRA coverage. First, Pennsylvania Act 2 of 2009 was signed into law to
give employees of small businesses who receive health insurance from their employers the right to purchase continuation health
insurance after they leave employment. Second, Connecticut allowed COBRA coverage up to 30 months on May 2010
(Connecticut Public Act 10-13). This study tests results with and without Pennsylvania and Connecticut and, in both cases, the
results are robust.

4
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(IRS), 2009). For employees, their employers usually cover a portion of the premium.5 The
premium under the COBRA is around four times higher for family coverage and six times higher
for single individuals compared with when they were employed.
The ARRA, passed on February 17, 2009, subsidized 65 percent of the COBRA premium
starting with the very next period of coverage, typically March 1st, for individuals who lost their
jobs involuntarily between September 1, 2008 and May 31, 2010 and were ineligible for other
group health coverage (e.g., a spouse's plan or new employer’s plan) or Medicare (IRS, 2009).
The premium subsidy can be drawn up to 15 months. Those who were laid off on or after
September 1, 2008 but before February 17, 2009 became eligible for the subsidy retroactively
and were given a second chance to elect the COBRA coverage. Employers covered by federal or
state COBRA laws were mandated by the ARRA to send notices within thirty days of job
termination to ex-workers who had previously enrolled in their employers’ group health
insurance plan. The employees (and their qualified dependents) were asked to decide whether to
take up the subsidized coverage within sixty days. After eligible unemployed workers who take
up the subsidy pay 35 percent of premiums, their former employers will pay 65 percent of
premiums and receive reimbursement via federal tax credits. If eligible unemployed workers
don’t report that they or their families are qualified for other group health coverage or Medicare
and receive the subsidy, they will need to pay penalties of up to 100 percent of the subsidy
received.

3. Theoretical Prediction

5
On average, 82 percent of the premium costs is paid by the employer for single coverage and 72 percent for family coverage
(Kaiser/HRET, 2012).
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Mortensen (1977) suggests that the following analysis is applicable when comparing any two
groups, one receiving benefits (COBRA premium subsidy), the other not, provided that members
of both groups qualify for benefits (COBRA) during an employer-initiated unemployment spell.
Specifically, because the potential benefit period per unemployment spell is limited and because
qualification is limited to workers who become unemployed due to their employers, unemployed
workers receiving no extra benefit have an incentive to become employed more rapidly than
would otherwise be the case.
The ARRA COBRA premium subsidy reduces substantial medical costs for the COBRA
eligible individuals and hence, may contribute to longer unemployment duration compared to
their counterparts. I also test this hypothesis on subsidy-eligible groups of people who are: older
(35 or above); educated (some college or above); older and educated; married (spouse present or
absent); and the full sample. Next, before I discuss these groups, it is useful to consider two types
of costs related to insurance options: monetary cost (covered by 65 percent premium subsidy)
and information cost (such as the time it takes to learn that the COBRA premium subsidy is
available). In terms of monetary cost, this subsidy will help unemployed individuals with high
medical costs (i.e., higher insurance premium) to reduce their unemployed costs substantially.
Unemployed workers with higher education may have smaller information costs because they
may be more aware of the ARRA subsidy, as well as be able to better comprehend the related
policies. Apart from smaller information costs, this subsidy can further reduce unemployed costs
for the educated. Consequently, the older educated may have much lower unemployed costs due
to smaller information and monetary costs. Lastly, married unemployed individuals may have a
longer unemployment spell because the higher the insurance premium costs for their family
members, the higher amount of premium subsidy they will receive.
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4. Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data
The impact of the COBRA premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment is examined
using data from the 2008 panel of the SIPP, (a longitudinal, stratified, random sample of families
in the United States). The SIPP full panel that began in 2008 (the 2008–2012 SIPP) enrolled
people from May 2008 through August 2008 and followed them for 52 months, which enables
comparisons of the duration of unemployment during and beyond the implementation of the
subsidy. The survey uses a 4-month recall period to conduct interviews every 4 months and asks
respondents about their employment status and insurance coverage, among other things, in each
of the previous 4 months. With monthly information on health insurance status and employment
status, the impact of the premium subsidy could be more accurately measured compared to the
Current Population Study, which only contains yearly information.
The longitudinal structure, along with the rich demographic and socioeconomic
information in SIPP, allows for the tracking of each unemployed individual for a period of four
to five years while controlling for underlying factors influencing individual preference for
insurance. To identify the unemployed individuals that are eligible for the COBRA coverage,
and the subsidy respectively, the person-month format is collapsed into person-record format and
the unemployed cohorts are constructed by identifying when they began their unemployment
spell. Therefore, the populations that are eligible for the COBRA coverage, and hence the
subsidy, could be identified.
Collapsing the data into 126,275 individuals makes the analysis much more manageable
than working with the underlying 3.91 million observations. Moreover, it allows researchers to
easily understand and control for the individual characteristics involved in choosing the COBRA
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subsidy. To identify those who potentially elected the COBRA coverage, the monthly health
insurance status and employment status are used as indicators of whether individuals obtain
health insurance through their former employers when they become unemployed. Further, those
who lost their jobs involuntarily during the implementation of the subsidy could be identified and
thus, they are potentially eligible for the COBRA premium subsidy.
Ryscavage (1988) uses two definitions of unemployment: a limited definition and a
comprehensive definition.6 The limited definition is confined to only two scenarios. The first
identifies individuals as being unemployed (looking for work or on layoff) the entire month. The
second identifies individuals as being unemployed for part of the month and not in the labor
force for the rest of the month. The comprehensive definition of unemployment includes two
more scenarios. The other two scenarios reflect individuals who, in addition to being
unemployed at the same time during the month, also had a job, or had a job as well as some time
outside the labor force.
This paper uses Ryscavage’s comprehensive definition of unemployment to identify
unemployed individuals, instead of the limited definition of unemployment, because it provides
more stable results for a large sample. After I reconstruct the data and identify unemployment
cohorts for each month separately, from March 2010 to August 2010, the monthly cohorts could
be further accumulated into an aggregate sample to obtain better and more precise estimates. In
order to check whether the results are robust to the time trend, this aggregate sample is divided
into three different cohorts based on the end of subsidy eligibility, May 31st, 2010. The three
different cohorts are: May/June = unemployment begins in May 2010-June 2010; April-

6

In SIPP, the comprehensive definition of unemployment are defined as follows: (1) With job entire month, missed 1 or more
weeks because of a layoff; (2) With job part of month, some time spent on layoff or looking for work; (3) No job in month, spent
entire month on layoff or looking for work; (4) No job in month, spent part of month on layoff or looking for work. The limited
definition of unemployment only consists of persons with (3) and (4).
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May/June-July = unemployment begins in April 2010-July 2010; and Mar.-May/June-Aug. =
unemployment begins in March 2010-August 2010. Lastly, each unemployed individual is traced
until he or she obtained his or her first paid job so that I am able to calculate the duration of
unemployment.

4.2 Empirical strategy
In order to distinguish between the subsidy-eligible and the subsidy-ineligible unemployed
individuals, this study uses the end of subsidy eligibility, May 31st, 2010, as the cut-off date to
estimate the effect of the subsidy. After the ARRA passed in February 2009, the unemployed
individuals have an available health insurance premium subsidy if they are separated from their
jobs before/to the end of subsidy eligibility. They can reduce their health insurance premiums
substantially by taking this subsidy immediately after job termination. Therefore, I compare the
unemployment duration of two different unemployed cohorts who lost their jobs just before and
after the end of subsidy eligibility to identify the effect of the premium subsidy on the labor
market outcome.
The subsidy effect can’t be estimated by using the beginning of subsidy eligibility (i.e.,
September 2008) for two reasons. First, the health insurance premium subsidy is not available for
workers who become unemployed during September 2008; they can’t foresee the presence of the
premium subsidy, which is available 6 months after job loss. Some unemployed workers may
make up their mind on a job search plan within a few months after they lost their jobs. Others
may also begin looking for jobs right away because of financial burdens (e.g., living expenses,
health insurance premiums and so on). Second, unemployed individuals usually find a job within
six months after job termination. The six-month gap between September 2008 and February
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2009 prevents eligible unemployed individuals from utilizing the subsidy if they become reemployed with health insurance benefits during this period.
This study compares the duration of unemployment during, and beyond, the subsidyeligible period for a population that is eligible for the COBRA premium subsidy, controlling for
a number of characteristics of individuals that could affect preferences for insurance. If the
relationship parameter β is estimated by regressing the observed Duration on Subsidy, the
resulting ordinary least squares regression estimator is inconsistent. It will yield a downward
biased estimate of the slope coefficient and an upward biased estimate of the intercept. Takeshi
Amemiya (1973) has proven that the maximum likelihood estimator suggested by Tobin for this
model is consistent.
The basic Tobit models are of the forms:

DURATION* = α + β*SUBSIDY + δ*X + u, u ~ i.i.d. N (0, σ2) (1)
LOG (DURATION)* = α + β*SUBSIDY + δ*X + u, u ~ i.i.d. N (0, σ2) (2)

Duration* if Duration* < Durationul
Duration =
Durationul if Duration* ≥ Durationul
where Durationul is the upper limit of duration. The model supposes that there is a latent (i.e.,
unobservable) variable Duration*. This variable linearly depends on SUBSIDY via a parameter
(vector) β which determines the relationship between the independent variable (or
vector) SUBSIDY and the latent variable Duration* (just as in a linear model). In addition, there
is a normally distributed error term u to capture random influences on this relationship. The

11
observable variable Duration is defined to be equal to the latent variable whenever the latent
variable is above or equal to the upper limit of duration, and less than the upper limit of duration
otherwise. The β coefficient is interpreted as the combination of: one, the change in Duration of
those above the limit, weighted by the probability of being above the limit; and two, the change
in the probability of being above the limit, weighted by the expected value of Duration if above.
Using LOG (DURATION) as the dependent variable in a model, the coefficient on a
dummy variable, when multiplied by 100, is interpreted as the percentage difference in
DURATION, holding all other factors fixed. The vector of control variables, X, represents
individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics including age, race, marital status,
education level, sex, and number of own children less than 18 years old in the family.
The source of variation in SUBSIDY is clear when we collapse the underlying micro-data
from 3.91 million observations to 126,275 individuals: the preference for insurance arises from
variations across age, race, marital status, education level, sex, and number of own children less
than 18 years old in the family. Obviously each of these dimensions is correlated with
preferences for insurance, so the regression for every category could be controlled. Therefore, in
this specification, identification comes from the variation in the premium subsidy within these
groups. That is, this approach uses the fact that the premium subsidy changes for the eligible
versus the non-eligible unemployed workers over time.
This is a powerful empirical framework. It allows for differences in individual choice of
insurance between the eligible and the non-eligible unemployed workers, and controls for any
observable factors which might affect the relative demand for insurance by the eligible and the
in-eligible unemployed workers over time. Subsidizing non-employment through the COBRA
does raise the likelihood that prime-age males leave their jobs (Gruber and Madrian, 1997).
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However, given this era of historically severe recession, very high layoffs, and long lags in
finding new jobs, the probability of separating from the COBRA or the COBRA premium
subsidy should be minimal.
Another concern is that the COBRA itself may have effects on the duration of
unemployment. In theory, we could employ the hazard model to investigate the effect of the
COBRA on the unemployment duration directly (Meyer, 1990). In practice, however, the
Meyer’s model would make it difficult to interpret the findings, since the sample of workers
becoming unemployed is itself affected by the availability of the COBRA or even affected by the
COBRA premium subsidy. Of course, there are potential concerns that other changes that are
correlated with the change in the premium subsidy could bias these estimates. For instance, if
those becoming unemployed have disproportionately short spells because of the COBRA or the
COBRA premium subsidy, this would bias downward the estimated effect of the COBRA
premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment.
Therefore, a more aggregate approach is taken to look at the effect of the COBRA
premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment during a six-month period.7 That is, a sample
of unemployed workers is taken from March 2010 to August 2010. After accumulating more
monthly cohorts, the estimates will be more reliable and precise and the results are consistent
across different cohorts.

5. Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics and figures
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for two different unemployed cohorts. One is for the
subsidy-eligible unemployed individuals, and the other is for the subsidy-ineligible unemployed
7

This parallels the approach of Levine (1993) and Gruber and Madrian (1997)
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workers. The relatively low fraction of married and relatively high fraction of non-white female
workers is indicative of the subsidy-eligible cohorts' characteristics. Across all unemployed
cohorts, the mean duration is higher for the subsidy-eligible unemployed workers compared to
the subsidy-ineligible unemployed individuals. In addition to the higher average duration for the
subsidy-eligible unemployed workers, the COBRA eligible has the largest average duration
among all other groups. In terms of mean age and average level of education, there is not much
difference between the subsidy-eligible and the subsidy-ineligible unemployed workers. The
mean age is close to 40 years old while the average level of education is some college or above.
In order to see how these unemployed workers respond to the subsidy in terms of
unemployed spells, figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the spell distributions for the two different
unemployed cohorts, the subsidy-eligible and subsidy-ineligible unemployed individuals. From
the figures, the shape of these two graphs are similar but the density of spell length for longer
unemployed spells are larger for subsidy-eligible group compared to the subsidy-ineligible group.

5.2 Basic regression results
Estimates obtained from Tobit regression support the hypothesis that an intensive health
insurance premium subsidy increased the spell duration for the subsidy-eligible unemployed,
even controlling for the underlying individual choice of insurance. Furthermore, estimates based
upon the other five groups of unemployed workers who are eligible for the subsidy indicates
significant, but smaller impacts of the premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment. Table
1.2 presents the results for all three cohorts from estimating Eq. (1) by controlling the covariates.
In this regression, the coefficient on SUBSIDY, β (subsidy effect), is positive and statistically
significant almost across all three cohorts, and it measures the average difference in the duration
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of unemployment between the subsidy-eligible and the subsidy-ineligible unemployed workers,
given the same levels of age, race, marital status, education level, sex, and number of own
children less than 18 years old in the family.
Table 1.2 has six panels; in all six cases comparisons are made relative to the subsidyineligible unemployed workers conditional on underlying factors influencing individual
preference for insurance. The results in panel A show that the subsidy had a significant impact
on the COBRA subsidy-eligible unemployed workers, which are predicted to increase by
between 2.09 months and 2.62 months. The COBRA subsidy-eligible unemployed workers have
a much larger behavioral response to the premium subsidy than the other groups because the
COBRA eligible group is the main beneficiary of the ARRA COBRA subsidy. These results are
consistent with the predictions of job search theory.
Evidence in panels B to E reflects that the subsidy had a significant predicted impact on
respective targeted subsidy-eligible groups. In particular, a smaller impact is observed in the full
sample of unemployed workers (increased by between 1.08 months and 1.75 months, panel B),
the older (age 35 or above) unemployed workers (increased by between 1.02 months and 1.27
months, panel C), the educated (some college or above) unemployed workers (increased by
between 1.52 months and 2.38 months, panel D), the older educated unemployed workers
(increased by between 1.59 months and 2.15 months, panel E), and the married (spouse present
or absent) unemployed workers (increased by between 0.96 month and 1.46 months, panel F).
I provide the following explanations for the observed impact. The reason for the increase
in older and married participants could be attributed to the likeliness of having unemployed
workers with high medical costs and, therefore, higher insurance premiums subsidized. Next, the
educated unemployed workers will have a longer unemployment duration because they will have
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much lower unemployed costs due to the subsidy and better comprehension of the complex
policies. Lastly, the older educated unemployed individuals may have much lower overall
unemployed cost because of both a higher premium subsidy and smaller information cost.
Table 1.3 presents the results for all three cohorts from estimating Eq. (2) by controlling
the covariates. In this regression, the coefficient on SUBSIDY, β (subsidy effect), is again positive
and statistically significant across all three cohorts and it measures the average percentage
difference in duration of unemployment between the subsidy-eligible and the subsidy-ineligible
unemployed workers, given the same levels of age, race, marital status, education level, sex, and
number of own children less than 18 years old in the family.
Table 1.3 has six panels; in all six cases comparisons are made relative to subsidyineligible unemployed workers conditional on underlying preferences for insurance. In panel A,
the COBRA subsidy-eligible unemployed workers are predicted to significantly increase
unemployment duration by between 24.45 percent and 34.76 percent. Results in panels B to F
show that the subsidy also had a significant predicted impact on the following subsidy-eligible
groups: the full sample (increased by between 13.03 percent and 24.46 percent, panel B), the
older (increased by between 12.37 percent and 18.18 percent, panel C), the educated (increased
by between 21.72 percent and 35.19 percent, panel D), the older educated (increased by between
20.49 percent and 32.78 percent, panel E), and the married unemployed individuals (increased by
between 17.64 percent and 20.11 percent, panel F). These results are also consistent with the
predictions of job search theory.
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5.3 Unemployment Insurance benefits
Some may argue that the subsidy effect on unemployment duration is partially or completely
driven by these Unemployment Insurance (UI) extensions, concerned that UI provides a
disincentive to search for work. However, such estimated disincentive effects have typically been
small (Katz, 2010 and Card and Levine, 2000). Further, the literature suggests that the UI effect
on job search behavior is likely even smaller in recessions.8 As an example, workers who are
eligible for unemployment insurance during the current recession are finding jobs at a nearly
identical rate to those who are ineligible (Valletta and Kuang, 2010).
Typically, unemployed workers can receive up to 26 weeks of benefits, as long as they
continue to search for work. In 2008, Congress created Emergency Unemployment
Compensation (EUC) recognizing that unemployed workers were having a significantly more
difficult time finding jobs than in a non-recession climate. Later, Congress extended and
expanded the program by providing 100 percent federal funding of Extended Benefits (EB) after
the labor market worsened. Individuals are eligible for EB once they exhaust their EUC benefits
if their states meet certain unemployment-based triggers. Thus, an unemployed worker could
receive up to 99 weeks of coverage in those states with the highest rates of unemployment
(Council of Economic Advisers report, 2010).9
In order to control UI benefits, an extended version of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are estimated:

DURATION* = α + β*SUBSIDY + δ*X + λ*UI + u, u ~ i.i.d. N (0, σ2) (1’)
LOG (DURATION)* = α + β*SUBSIDY + δ*X + λ*UI + u, u ~ i.i.d. N (0, σ2), (2’)

8
9

See Kroft and Notowidigdo (2010) and Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2010).
See Table A1 for more detail on these programs.
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where UI is an indicator for how many number of weeks of UI benefits an unemployed
individual can receive given the state he or she resides in. Therefore, by controlling UI benefits,
this specification can also control the labor market conditions among states since many of the
eligible weeks of benefits are determined at the state level by thresholds based on states’
unemployment rate. That is, the maximum length of coverage provided by these federal
programs is shorter in states with better economies.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the results from estimating Eq. (1’) and Eq. (2’), in all three
cohorts conditional on underlying preferences for insurance and unemployment insurance
benefits varying among states. These results show that the subsidy effect on unemployment
duration is robust to unemployment insurance benefits, which further confirms that the subsidy
effect on the duration of unemployment is mainly from the ARRA. The evidence in Tables 1.4
and 1.5 is consistent with Gruber and Madrian’s study; the insignificant relationship between
months of COBRA and the UI maximum benefit indicates that omitted variable bias from not
simultaneously modeling the UI system should be minimal (Gruber and Madrian, 1997).

5.4 Robustness checks
5.4.1 Analysis of Subsidy selection by unemployed workers
Due to the availability of the health insurance premium subsidy, workers who are eligible for this
benefit if they become unemployed may not financially need their jobs to the same degree as
workers who are not eligible because the eligible unemployed will have the cost of
unemployment reduced. Therefore, this subsidy may provide a disincentive for potentially
eligible workers. For example, the potentially eligible workers may feel less financial
pressure/obligation to maintain their employment if they are eligible to receive the subsidy.
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Whereas workers who are ineligible for the subsidy may have a financial need to stay employed,
and therefore workers who are eligible for the subsidy may be more secure with the threat of
unemployment. For instance, an employee, whose primary motivation to work is for the
availability of affordable health insurance, may have less incentive to work if a health care
subsidy is available outside employment.
Table 1.6 presents the unemployment rate and incoming unemployed workers (UW) rate
from February 2010 to August 2010.10 In order to identify whether there is any selection into the
premium subsidy between subsidy-eligible and subsidy-ineligible, I define UW as the number of
unemployed workers who enter the unemployment pool, and TU as the total unemployed
workers. Further, I define the UW rate=(UW/TU)·100. Since the unemployment rate (seasonally
adjusted) stays roughly unchanged (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010), I can use the UW rate to
represent the inflow of unemployment. If unemployed workers purposely lose their jobs to obtain
the subsidy, the UW rate should be high at/before the end of subsidy eligibility.
During the subsidy-eligible period (February 2010 to May 2010), the coefficients are
close to each other, which show that there is no “subsidy selection” behavior happening for
potential eligible employed workers. Intuitively, given the severe labor market conditions during
this time period, workers would not switch jobs easily for a health insurance premium subsidy.
Besides, after the subsidy eligible period, the coefficients are also close to each other from July
to August except for June. Two reasons may potentially explain why there is a spike for the UW
rate in June. First, the difference of the unemployment rate (not seasonally adjusted) between
May and June is 0.3 percent (9.6 percent -9.3 percent) representing 0.46 million unemployed
workers. That is, the inflow of unemployment in June will be higher than the inflow of
unemployment in May. Second, the difference in UW rate between May and June may depend
10

These are author calculations using the 2008 SIPP panel.

19
particularly on seasonal influences, which is why it is important to use a statistical method to
remove the seasonal component of a time series (e.g., unemployment rate) to analyze nonseasonal trends.
Therefore, I check whether there is a seasonal component for the UW rate between May
and June using the data from different years, 2009 and 2011. Table 1.7 shows that the differences
in the UW rate between May and June in 2009 and 2011 are 2.72 percent and 3.82 percent,
respectively, which are close to the difference in the UW rate between May and June in 2010
(3.83 percent). Therefore, these results indicate that there are seasonal components happening
with a similar magnitude during the May-June time period each year in SIPP. In sum, after
taking seasonal fluctuation into account, these results imply that there is no subsidy selection
between subsidy-eligible and subsidy-ineligible.

5.4.2 Seasonality check within COBRA eligible group
After checking seasonal components during the May-June time period each year in SIPP, I take
one more step to further check whether this seasonality would affect the magnitude for the
COBRA eligible group or not by looking at the data from the years 2009 and 2011, which were
not subsidy eligible periods. Therefore, if the subsidy effect within the COBRA eligible group is
insignificant for 2009 and 2011, that means the subsidy effect of the main results are driven by
the ARRA COBRA subsidy. As Table 1.8 shows, the results are not significant and that means
the seasonality is not affecting my main results.
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5.4.3 Subsidy effect on unemployment duration of COBRA ineligible group
After confirming that there is no “subsidy selection” behavior happening between subsidyeligible and subsidy-ineligible groups, I want to estimate the subsidy effect on the duration of
unemployment for the COBRA in-eligible group using a placebo test. This test allows me to
evaluate how likely it is to find a “false positive” when studying the ARRA COBRA premium
subsidy effect. If I was to find a significant effect even in the group that had not been eligible for
the subsidy, it would signal that the effects estimated in the COBRA eligible group may be
spurious. I perform the placebo test using the COBRA ineligible group. Table 1.9 shows that
there is no significant subsidy effect within the COBRA in-eligible group and the results further
confirm that the subsidy effect on the duration of unemployment for the COBRA eligible group
is mainly from ARRA.

5.4.4 Monthly variation and false end of subsidy eligibility
The false end of subsidy eligibility is set to see whether there is any subsidy effect on the
duration of unemployment. During the subsidy-eligible period, January 2010 is set as the false
end of subsidy eligibility; beyond the subsidy-eligible period, August 2010 is set as the false end
of subsidy eligibility. I use two different unemployed cohorts who lost their jobs to investigate
the effect of the premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment under the false end of
subsidy eligibility scenario during, and beyond the subsidy-eligible period, respectively. The
results in panel A in Table 1.10 show that the predicted subsidy effect is much smaller and
insignificant under the false end of subsidy eligibility compared to the right end of subsidy
eligibility, May 31st, 2010. Taking Jan’10 as the false end during the original subsidy-eligible
period, the new subsidy-eligible/ineligible group can be established (Dec’09-Jan’10/Feb’10-
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Mar’10). After controlling for underlying preference and UI, this group has negative and much
smaller coefficients, which further show there is no subsidy effect on the false end of subsidy
eligibility. Similarly, taking Aug’10 as the false end beyond the original subsidy-eligible period,
the new subsidy-eligible/ineligible group can be established (Jun’10-Jul’10/Aug’10-Sep’10).
After controlling the covariates and UI, this group also has negative and much smaller
coefficients.
Some may argue that the effect of the premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment
is driven by the variation between monthly cohorts. I employ two different unemployed
neighboring cohorts to see the subsidy effect on the unemployment duration between monthly
cohorts during and beyond the subsidy-eligible period, respectively. Panel B in Table 1.10
indicates that the subsidy effect from monthly variation is much smaller and insignificant
compared to the results of the May/June cohort in Table 1.2. Similarly, the percentage
differences of the subsidy effect are also much smaller and insignificant.
In sum, two things are indicated. First, there is no significant subsidy effect under the
false end of subsidy eligibility, and the results further confirm that the subsidy effect on the
duration of unemployment is mainly from the ARRA. Second, it shows that the main results are
not driven by the variations between monthly cohorts because the variations between monthly
cohorts are relatively small compared to the main results presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3.

5.4.5 Unemployment exit rate at the end of COBRA/COBRA subsidy
Meyer (1990) finds the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to
when benefits lapse. In order to check whether this scenario is happening here, results in Table
1.11 show the spell length for the subsidy-eligible and COBRA-eligible (i.e., subsidy-ineligible)
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groups. In order to make the estimates be more reliable and precise, I add the number of
individuals who become unemployed from Jan. 2010 to May 2010 and those are eligible for the
15-month premium subsidy. Likewise, I add the number of individuals who become unemployed
from June 2010 to Dec. 2010 and those are eligible for 18-month COBRA premium. If the
unemployed workers are having high probability of leaving unemployment at the end of the
benefit, then we expect to see that there will be a spike when the benefits stop. The results in
Table 1.11 show that there is no spike for the subsidy-eligible group when the spell length is
equal to 15 months (i.e., the end of subsidy) and there is also no spike for the COBRA-eligible
group when the spell length is equal to 18 months. These results confirm that there is no leaving
unemployment behavior when benefits lapse.

6. Implication in terms of UI
This study suggests that the subsidy had a positive statistically significant impact on the
unemployment duration for subsidy-eligible unemployed workers. A tremendous amount of
literature exists about how UI affects the unemployment duration. In this section, I will discuss
how the UI literature can help us interpret the results obtained from the ARRA COBRA
premium subsidy study.
Katz and Meyer (1990) indicate that if the benefit level is reduced by 10 percent it
decreases the predicted mean weeks of unemployment by 1.5 weeks. The average unemployment
benefit is about $300 per week in 2010, 2011, and 2012 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
2013). That is, a potential increase of $30 extra in UI benefit will lead to an increase by 1.5
weeks in unemployment duration. In this study, the COBRA premium subsidy-eligible
unemployed workers significantly increased the predicted mean month of unemployment by 2.11
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months. As a result, the predicted mean month of extended unemployment duration resulting
from the premium subsidy is equivalent to the effect of increasing UI benefits by 56 percent.11

7. Conclusion
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided a 65 percent health
insurance premium subsidy for workers who lost their jobs involuntarily and elected to take up
COBRA coverage. This paper shows that the COBRA premium subsidy-eligible unemployed
workers significantly increased unemployment duration conditional on underlying factors
influencing their individual preferences for insurance and UI benefits. Moreover, the subsidy had
a significant but smaller impact on the duration of unemployment for the following groups: full
sample, married, older, educated, and older-educated unemployed individuals. These empirical
results are consistent with the predictions of job search theory.
The behavioral responses to financial incentives are interesting from a scientific point of
view because they allow me to investigate to what extent results are coherent with theoretical
predictions. Theory provides predictions about the search intensity behavior pattern over the
duration of unemployment. However, theoretical prediction only provides a description about the
direction of the effects, but could not provide a rough estimate of their magnitude. With
reference to the behavioral reaction of subsidy-eligible unemployed workers, these responses
give some ideas about the potential degree of unemployment duration.
From a policy point of view this study is interesting as well. Extending the COBRA
premium subsidy for individuals who experience such a loss in health insurance coverage when
they become unemployed may correct market deficiencies (Gruber and Madrian, 1997).
However, this study shows the government intervention has unintended side effects such as
11

(2.11*4/1.5)*$30=$168; ($168/$300)*100%=56%
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distorting employment decisions. This cost of lengthening the duration of unemployment must
be weighed against the benefit which may be a more productive job search for higher paying
positions from Ehrenberg and Oaxaca’s study. However, in my study, I notice that there is no
relation between a longer unemployment duration and higher post-employment wages. Therefore,
there is much room here for future study.
While there has been a tremendous amount of literature on how Unemployment
Insurance (UI) affects the unemployed workers’ job search behavior, there has been no previous
study on how the health insurance premium subsidy affects the unemployed workers’ job search
behavior. This study fills this gap and finds that the extended unemployment duration resulting
from the premium subsidy is equivalent to the effect of increasing UI benefits by 56 percent
which indicates that the COBRA premium subsidy is having an important impact on the
unemployed workers’ job transition behavior.
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Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics

Variable

Unemployed cohorts (March 2010-August-2010)
Subsidy-eligible (before
Subsidy-ineligible (after
May 31st, 2010)
May 31st, 2010)
# of individuals
Mean
# of individuals
Mean

COBRA eligible
Duration (May/June)
Duration (April-May/June-July)
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug)

42
80
126

8.357
9.000
9.579

62
101
139

6.468
7.029
7.381

Full Sample
Duration (May/June)
Duration (April-May/June-July)
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug)

299
555
867

8.806
8.863
8.850

406
733
1038

7.431
7.873
7.835

Demographic characteristics
Full sample (Mar-May/June-Aug)
Age (years)
Female (%)
Non-white (%)
Education
Married (%)
# of own children
# of individuals

40.38
42.09
22.49
40.12
39.56
0.63
867

40.36
41.81
20.42
40.18
41.32
0.62
1038

Note: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010 shows that the average (mean) duration is 34.6 weeks (8.65 months) for 2010
and 40.2 weeks (10.05 months) for January 2011.
May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility.
Variable definitions: Duration = completed spell duration; Education= highest education level attained, 40 here
indicates some college or above; Married = married with spouse present or absent; # of own children = number of
own children less than 18 years old in family.
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Variable

Unemployed cohorts (March 2010-August-2010)
Subsidy-eligible (before
Subsidy-ineligible (after
May 31st, 2010)
May 31st, 2010)
# of individuals
Mean
# of individuals
Mean

Older
Duration (May/June)
Duration (April-May/June-July)
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug)

161
307
498

8.373
8.736
9.122

231
414
581

7.229
7.778
7.840

Educated
Duration (May/June)
Duration (April-May/June-July)
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug)

172
308
484

8.994
9.136
8.888

224
417
572

6.763
7.439
7.460

Older educated
Duration (May/June)
Duration (April-May/June-July)
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug)

94
176
290

8.394
8.898
8.965

136
254
351

6.074
7.063
7.362

Married
Duration (May/June)
Duration (April-May/June-July)
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug)

119
222
343

7.445
7.883
8.184

170
300
429

6.559
6.890
6.737
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Figure 1.1 Spell distribution for Subsidy-eligible group

Note: The sample is from the unemployed cohorts (March 2010-May 2010) within COBRA eligible group.
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Figure 1.2 Spell distribution for Subsidy-ineligible group

Note: The sample is from the unemployed cohorts (June 2010-Aug. 2010) within COBRA eligible group.
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Table 1.2 Subsidy effect on unemployment duration using Tobit
Subsidy-eligible / Subsidy-ineligible (control covariates)
Spell Length (month)
May/June
April-May/June-July
Mar-May/June-Aug
Panel A: COBRA eligible
Subsidy effect
2.1863
2.0996
2.6222
[1.6972]
[1.307]*
[1.1363]**
# of individuals
104
181
265
Panel B: Full sample
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel C: Older
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel D: Educated
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel E: Older educated
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel F: Married
Subsidy effect
# of individuals

1.7587
[0.8306]**
705

1.2366
[0.6338]**
1288

1.0836
[0.5573]**
1905

1.1833
[0.985]
392

1.0282
[0.7541]
721

1.2774
[0.6634]*
1079

2.3868
[0.9246]***
396

1.8974
[0.7325]***
725

1.5226
[0.6213]**
1056

2.1557
[1.0314]**
230

1.9494
[0.8459]**
430

1.596
(0.7306)**
641

0.9603
[0.8923]
289

1.0675
[0.7356]
522

1.4697
[0.6214]**
772

Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
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Table 1.3 Subsidy effect on log unemployment duration using Tobit
Subsidy-eligible / Subsidy-ineligible (control covariates)
Log [Spell Length (month)]
May/June
April-May/June-July
Mar-May/June-Aug
Panel A: COBRA eligible
Subsidy effect
0.2848
0.2445
0.3476
[0.2375]
[0.1813]
[0.1542]**
# of individuals
104
181
265
Panel B: Full sample
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel C: Older
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel D: Educated
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel E: Older educated
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel F: Married
Subsidy effect
# of individuals

0.2446
[0.1131]**
705

0.162
[0.0864]*
1288

0.1303
[0.0723]*
1905

0.1818
[0.1385]
392

0.1237
[0.1051]
721

0.1488
[0.0879]*
1079

0.3519
[0.1248]***
396

0.2832
[0.1004]***
725

0.2172
[0.0836]***
1056

0.3278
[0.1442]**
230

0.2572
[0.1185]**
430

0.2049
[0.1012]**
641

0.1935
[0.1336]
289

0.1764
[0.1071]*
522

0.2011
[0.0881]**
772

Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
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Table 1.4 Subsidy effect on unemployment duration using Tobit and controlling for UI
Subsidy-eligible / Subsidy-ineligible (control covariates)
Spell Length (month)
May/June
April-May/June-July
Mar-May/June-Aug
Panel A: COBRA eligible
Subsidy effect
2.1196
2.1137
2.6255
[1.7165]
[1.3055]*
[1.1354]**
# of individuals
104
181
265
Panel B: Full sample
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel C: Older
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel D: Educated
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel E: Older educated
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel F: Married
Subsidy effect
# of individuals

1.7587
[0.8306]**
705

1.2366
[0.6338]**
1288

1.1032
[0.5567]**
1905

1.1063
[0.987]
392

1.0276
[0.7542]
721

1.2729
[0.6631]*
1079

2.2623
[0.9312]**
396

1.8767
[0.7305]***
725

1.5328
[0.6206]**
1056

1.8147
[1.0497]*
230

1.9003
[0.8478]**
430

1.5824
(0.7326)**
641

0.9406
[0.8921]
289

1.0572
[0.7362]
522

1.4554
[0.6204]**
772

Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets.
UI=unemployment insurance
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
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Table 1.5 Subsidy effect on log unemployment duration using Tobit and controlling for UI
Subsidy-eligible / Subsidy-ineligible (control covariates)
Log [Spell Length (month)]
May/June
April-May/June-July
Mar-May/June-Aug
Panel A: COBRA eligible
Subsidy effect
0.2713
0.2473
0.3479
[0.2379]
[0.1812]
[0.1542]**
# of individuals
104
181
265
Panel B: Full sample
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel C: Older
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel D: Educated
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel E: Older educated
Subsidy effect
# of individuals
Panel F: Married
Subsidy effect
# of individuals

0.2446
[0.1131]**
705

0.162
[0.0864]*
1288

0.1336
[0.0721]*
1905

0.1681
[0.1385]
392

0.1237
[0.1051]
721

0.1483
[0.0879]*
1079

0.329
[0.1259]***
396

0.2812
[0.1003]***
725

0.2191
[0.0836]***
1056

0.2663
[0.1456]*
230

0.2487
[0.119]**
430

0.2026
[0.1014]**
641

0.19
[0.1334]
289

0.175
[0.1072]*
522

0.1991
[0.0886]**
772

Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets.
UI=unemployment insurance
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
*
Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
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Table 1.6 Subsidy selection check by unemployed worker groups
2010
Feb.
Mar.
April
May
Bureau of Labor Statistics
(Unadj) Unemployment rate
10.4
10.2
9.5
9.3
(Adj) Unemployment rate (%)
9.8
9.9
9.9
9.6

June

July

Aug.

9.6
9.4

9.7
9.5

9.5
9.5

COBRA eligible
Total Unemployed
New Unemployed workers
New Unemployed workers (%)

344
46
13.37

333
46
13.81

324
38
11.73

306
42
13.73

310
62
20.00

281
39
13.88

282
38
13.48

COBRA ineligible
Total Unemployed
New Unemployed workers
New Unemployed workers (%)

4678
379
8.10

4624
403
8.71

4244
322
7.58

4083
375
9.18

4425
569
12.85

4260
421
9.88

4161
384
9.22

Full sample
Total Unemployed
New Unemployed workers
New Unemployed workers (%)

5022
425
8.46

4957
449
9.06

4568
360
7.88

4389
417
9.50

4735
631
13.33

4541
460
10.13

4443
422
9.50

Older
Total Unemployed
New Unemployed workers
New Unemployed workers (%)

2848
235
8.25

2820
272
9.65

2589
223
8.61

2,439
225
9.23

2583
385
14.91

2517
263
10.45

2460
229
9.31

Educated
Total Unemployed
New Unemployed workers
New Unemployed workers (%)

2682
243
9.06

2695
264
9.80

2480
209
8.43

2409
254
10.54

2612
386
14.78

2511
278
11.07

2497
241
9.65

Older educated
Total Unemployed
New Unemployed workers
New Unemployed workers (%)

1656
149
9.00

1652
168
10.17

1519
137
9.02

1442
138
9.57

1550
242
15.61

1510
171
11.32

1501
147
9.79

Married
Total Unemployed
New Unemployed workers
New Unemployed workers (%)

2059
180
8.74

2023
196
9.69

1828
174
9.52

1729
194
11.22

1853
309
16.68

1813
214
11.80

1778
184
10.35

Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. (Unadj) Unemployment rate= not seasonally
adjusted unemployment rate. (Adj) Unemployment rate=seasonally adjusted unemployment rate.
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Table 1.7 Subsidy selection check by unemployed worker between May/June in 2009 and 2011
2009
2011
May
June
May
June
Bureau of Labor Statistics
(Unadj) Unemployment rate
(Adj) Unemployment rate
Full sample
Total Unemployed
New Unemployed workers
New Unemployed workers (%)

9.1
9.4

9.7
9.5

8.7
9

9.3
9.1

4782
557
11.64

5089
731
14.36

3755
356
9.48

3923
522
13.30

Note: (Unadj) Unemployment rate= not seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. (Adj) Unemployment
rate=seasonally adjusted unemployment rate.
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Table 1.8 Seasonality check within COBRA eligible group between May/June in 2009 and 2011
using Tobit
Subsidy-eligible vs. Subsidy-ineligible
Spell Length (month)
2009
2011
May/June
May/June
COBRA eligible
Subsidy effect
0.1194
0.2408
[1.6124]
[1.6487]
# of individuals
119
63
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility.
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Table 1.9 Subsidy effect on unemployment duration using Tobit for COBRA in-eligible group
Subsidy-eligible vs. Subsidy-ineligible
Spell Length (month)
2010
May/June
April-May/June-July
Mar-May/June-Aug
COBRA in-eligible
Subsidy effect
-0.5649
-0.0995
0.1199
[0.3598]
[0.2719]
[0.2232]
# of individuals
601
1107
1640
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets.
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Table 1.10 False end of subsidy eligibility and monthly variation checks using Tobit
Subsidy-eligible vs. Subsidy-ineligible
Panel A: False end of subsidy eligibility check
Jan'10
Aug'10
Dec'09-Jan'10/ Feb'10-Mar'10
Jul'10-Aug'10/ Sep'10-Oct'10
Spell
Log [Spell]
Spell
Log [Spell]
Subsidy Effect
-0.0252
-0.0107
-0.0457
-0.0494
[0.7494]
[0.0921]
[0.7557]
[0.1125]
# of individuals
1456
1235
Panel B: Monthly variation check
Jan'10/ Feb'10
Aug'10/ Sep'10
Spell
Log [Spell]
Spell
Log [Spell]
Subsidy effect
0.4727
0.0453
0.0261
-0.0438
[1.3154]
[0.1581]
[0.9929]
[0.155]
# of individuals
638
621
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets.
UI=unemployment insurance
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Table 1.11 Unemployment exit rate at the end of COBRA/COBRA subsidy check
Subsidy-eligible
COBRA-eligible
(individuals)
(individuals)
Spell Length (month)
Percent
1
29
17.68%
35
2
23
14.02%
25
3
15
9.15%
15
4
26
15.85%
26
5
11
6.71%
12
6
4
2.44%
16
7
5
3.05%
4
8
8
4.88%
6
9
4
2.44%
9
10
2
1.22%
3
11
6
3.66%
3
12
3
1.83%
1
13
5
3.05%
4
14
1
0.61%
1
15
4
2.44%
3
16
1
0.61%
2
17
4
2.44%
1
18
3
1.83%
0
19
5
3.05%
0
20
1
0.61%
0
0
21
2
1.22%
0
23
1
0.61%
0
25
1
0.61%
Total individuals

164

166

Percent
21.08%
15.06%
9.04%
15.66%
7.23%
9.64%
2.41%
3.61%
5.42%
1.81%
1.81%
0.60%
2.41%
0.60%
1.81%
1.20%
0.60%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
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Table 1.A1 Details and schedule of Unemployment Insurance coverage
Panel A: Details coverage
Program
Length (weeks)
Eligibility
State Unemployment Insurance
26
all
Tier 1
20
all
Emergency Unemployment
Compensation
Tier 2
14
all
state unemployment rate >
6%
Tier 3
13
state unemployment rate >
Tier 4
6
8.5%

Extended Benefits

Option 1

13

Option 2

20

Panel B: Benefits schedule
Unemployment rate (U)
U <= 6
6 < U <= 6.5
6.5 < U < 8.1
8 < U < 8.6
U > 8.5
Note: The schedule in Panel B is author’s calculation

state unemployment rate >
6.5%
state unemployment rate >
8%

Length (weeks)
60
73
86
93
99
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CHAPTER 2.The Impact of the Health Care Reform on the Applications for Disability Benefits:
Evidence from Massachusetts

1. Introduction
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides benefits to those who are physically
incapable of finding suitable work, is one of the largest income replacement programs in the
United States. In 2009, there were 9.7 million program recipients, on which the government
spent $124 billion in cash benefits and $70 billion in health care expenditures according to
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 2010. SSDI recipients receive a cash stipend that replaces,
on average, 45 percent of their previous earnings. Moreover, they will receive Medicare
coverage after a two-year waiting period.
Autor and Duggan (2006) provide several potential reasons why the SSDI rolls grow so
rapidly. First, the liberalization of Disability Insurance screening makes people suffering from
back pain and mental illness eligible. Next, the rise in the replacement rate (the ratio of disability
cash benefits to previous labor earnings) provides incentives for workers to seek benefits. Lastly,
the interactions of the above two factors with a rapid increase in the female labor force
participation explain the enormous growth of SSDI beneficiaries.
However, the health insurance component of the SSDI program has not been the subject
of much study except for Gruber and Kubik (2002). They find that potential SSDI beneficiaries
tend to have high medical cost, and they also show that those who have an alternative source of
insurance should they leave their job, are 26 to 74% more likely to apply for SSDI than those
without such an alternative source of health insurance. On average health costs are particularly
high for disabled individuals; in 2009, a SSDI recipient averaged $10,500 in Medicare health
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costs, which is equivalent to more than 80 percent of the average yearly SSDI cash benefit (CBO,
2010). The health insurance component of SSDI is therefore particularly valuable to these
disabled individuals. Thus, the 2006 Massachusetts health reform is likely to influence the
application rates for SSDI benefits, but whether it will result in more or fewer beneficiaries is
difficult to predict. Among other changes, the legislation will make it easier for people with
health problems to buy their own insurance; it will also provide new subsidies for individually
purchased coverage and expand eligibility for Medicaid.
This paper focuses on the hypothesis that the probability of applying for SSDI for
spouses without ESI will be higher compared to spouses with ESI coverage after the reform. The
differential is probable because potential beneficiaries for SSDI coverage who have stopgap
forms of health coverage are substantially more likely to apply for disability than potential
applicants who would lose other insurance coverage while awaiting eligibility for the disabilityrelated Medicare benefit. Understanding and quantifying the effects of health reform on the
disability insurance program is important because it will improve our ability to explain and
manage the increasing costs of the SSDI programs in terms of new beneficiaries and the size of
future caseloads.
I estimate the causal effect of the reform on SSDI beneficiaries using data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This survey follows a sample of persons for
four to five years, collecting data on their monthly SSDI beneficiary status, and spousal health
insurance status across the time period before and after the implementation of the health reform.
I evaluate the effect of the ESI expansion on the change of SSDI beneficiaries’ rate using
the near-universal expansion of health insurance coverage happening in Massachusetts in 2006.
Massachusetts simultaneously implemented premium credits to low- and middle-income
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residents. I perform a behavioral analysis that utilizes the variation in the intensity of the impact
of the reform across potential SSDI applicants. Potential SSDI applicants who are affected by the
ESI expansion will have more incentive to move onto SSDI rolls than the individuals who are
not affected by the ESI expansion. Additionally, I compare potential SSDI beneficiaries in
Massachusetts to similar counterparts in six nearby states. Exploiting the variation in treatment
intensity allows me to identify how expanding private insurance coverage affected SSDI
beneficiaries in a way that is robust to Massachusetts-specific time trends.
I have several findings. I find that for spouses without ESI, the positive effect of the ESI
expansion on SSDI participation is 0.98 percentage points stronger than it is for spouses with ESI.
These estimates imply that spouses without ESI are associated with higher SSDI beneficiaries
which accounts for a 10.7 percentage point increase in SSDI beneficiaries in Massachusetts after
the reform. Moreover, my estimates imply an elasticity of spouses without ESI with respect to
SSDI beneficiaries of 0.0913.
This rest of the paper is laid out in five sections. Section 2 gives an overview of the SSDI
program in the US and the ESI expansion in Massachusetts. This is followed by Section 3, which
discusses the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results for the impact of 2006
health reform on SSDI participation decisions, and Section 5 concludes.

2. Background
2.1 Social Security Disability Insurance
SSDI provides insurance for those persons who have an "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of physical or mental impairment" and this impairment must be
expected to last at least 12 months or result in death. Most applicants must have worked 20 of the
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40 quarters prior to the onset of disability to be eligible to apply for SSDI. Moreover, an
application for SSDI cannot be made unless the applicant has been out of work for at least five
months. After a waiting period of two years, SSDI recipients are eligible for Medicare coverage,
which is a very valuable benefit for the disabled with high medical costs.

2.2 Employer Sponsored Health Insurance expansions
Measuring the causal impact of insurance is notoriously difficult because it requires finding
exogenous sources of variation in insurance status. The natural experiment in this paper is a
particularly relevant source of credible exogenous variation to study the effect of private health
insurance on SSDI participation. In 2006, Massachusetts restructured the way private insurance
is purchased and sold to expand health insurance coverage to nearly all state residents.
Massachusetts combined an individual mandate to purchase insurance with a major expansion of
the Medicaid program and new subsidies for individuals earning up to 300 percent of the federal
poverty line. Under the new law, all residents must meet minimum health insurance coverage (to
avoid the loss of personal income tax exemption, $219 in 2007, with additional monthly
penalties which are based on 50 percent of the cost for the lowest-priced available insurance plan
beginning in 2008) when affordable coverage is available. For a detailed description of the
reform, see Gruber (2008) or Raymond (2007).
In addition to the mandate, Massachusetts dramatically increased free and subsidized
coverage to low-income households via the “MassHealth" Medicaid program, which expanded
eligibility for low-income individuals and children. Massachusetts also introduced a new
program, “Commonwealth Care," that subsidized private insurance to individuals earning up to
300 percent of the federal poverty line (with the level of subsidies based on income) who are not
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eligible for ESI or MassHealth. Massachusetts facilitates enrollment of individuals into both
subsidized and unsubsidized insurance plans (Lischko, 2009).

3. Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data
The impact of the ESI expansion, part of 2006 Massachusetts health reform, on SSDI
participation decisions is examined using data from both 2004 and 2008 panels of the SIPP, a
nationally representative longitudinal survey in the United States.12 The 2004 SIPP panel enrolls
persons from October 2003 through January 2004 and follows them for 48 months; whereas the
2008 SIPP panel enrolls persons from May 2008 through August 2008 and follows them for 52
months. The survey uses a 4-month recall period to conduct interviews every 4 months and
provides their monthly SSDI beneficiary status and spousal health insurance status that allowed
me to see the change of these two groups before and after the implementation of the health
reform. Moreover, this paper relies on administrative data sets from 2003 to 2009 for the SSDI
beneficiaries and population data from Social Security Administration (SSA) to calculate the
percentage of SSDI beneficiaries among states. Therefore, I can use the administrative data to
confirm the change of SSDI beneficiaries in SIPP.

3.2 Empirical strategy
My identification strategy relies on the assumption that, if the reform had not taken place, SSDI
beneficiaries in potential eligible—and ineligible—applicants in Massachusetts would have
evolved similarly. Taking advantage of the “natural experiment” that occurred in Massachusetts

12
The 2004 and 2008 SIPP panels can be used to produce state estimates. (SIPP USERS Guide, Chapter 10, Revisions 2009 Page
40)
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to compare the change in the SSDI beneficiaries among married couples ages 18 to 64 before and
after the state implemented its health reform initiative, using Difference-in-Difference (DD) and
Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) method.13The estimation approach exploits
variation over time (comparing pre-and post-reform time periods), across population groups
(comparing SSDI potential applicants who are affected by ESI expansion to SSDI potential
applicants who are not affected by ESI expansion), and across states (comparing Massachusetts
to comparison states in the Northeast that did not implement health reform).
Since Massachusetts implemented the health reform on April 2006 and the SSDI has a 5month waiting period plus the 19-month Medicare waiting period, my post-reform period using
the SSA and SIPP begins in 2008. After defining the pre-and post-reform periods, I then
compared the SSDI beneficiaries in the post-reform period of 2008-2009 to those beneficiaries in
the pre-reform period of 2003–2005 among married couples.
The comparison states provide an estimate of what would have happened in
Massachusetts in the absence of health reform. Identifying an appropriate comparison state is
difficult given the wide variation in state policies, programs and populations, and the frequency
with which other states were also implementing program and policy changes that affected SSDI
potential applicants over the study period. In this paper, I rely on four states in the New England
division (1.New Hampshire, NH; 2.Vermont, VT; 3.Rhode Island, RI; and 4.Connecticut, CT)
and two states in the Middle Atlantic division (5.New Jersey, NJ; 6.Pennsylvania, PA) in the
Northeast region as comparison states. The comparison group provides an estimate of what
would have happened in the absence of the ESI expansion within Massachusetts. The control
group consists of people who have health insurance from their spouse’s group/employer plan
because they can have health insurance whether this reform existed or not.
13

SIPP respondents are asked about the age to begin receiving Social Security Disability payments because of his/her disability.
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To estimate the overall impact of health reform on SSDI participation decisions, I
compared the change in the SSDI beneficiaries in Massachusetts to the change for a similar
group in comparison states before and after the reform by using a DD framework. The
comparison states control for underlying trends in the SSDI unrelated to health reform.
Furthermore, I extend the analysis by comparing the DD estimate on the potential SSDI
applicants who are affected by ESI expansion to an analogous DD estimate on the potential SSDI
applicants who are not affected by ESI expansion using a DDD framework.

4. The Impact of 2006 Health Reform on SSDI Participation Decisions
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for two different periods (pre vs. post) and two
different groups (USA vs. Massachusetts). One chart includes pre-reform SSDI beneficiaries,
and the other consists of post-reform SSDI rolls. Two things are indicated. First, both the
percentage of SSDI beneficiaries for US and Massachusetts are higher during the treatment
period compared to the control period. In particular, the number of SSDI rolls in Massachusetts
has increased more rapidly than the U.S. Second, the relatively low fraction of married female,
nonwhite workers, and relatively young age is indicative of the difference between US and
Massachusetts’ SSDI beneficiaries’ characteristics. In terms of average level of education, there
is not much difference across all SSDI beneficiaries, and the average level of education is high
school graduate.
I use two types of variation to identify the effect of employer sponsored insurance
coverage on SSDI participation decisions. First, I analyze the relative change in the rate of SSDI
beneficiaries and the rate of spouses without ESI in Massachusetts based on their exposure to the
reform compared to the rate of these two groups during the pre-reform period. Because the

49
reform instituted near-universal coverage, spouses without ESI have more incentive to apply for
SSDI than spouses with ESI. We should expect to see the rate of SSDI beneficiaries increase
because more potential SSDI applicants will try to apply when they have a stopgap form of
health insurance which is available after the health reform was implemented. Second, I compare
the variation in the rate of SSDI beneficiaries in Massachusetts with the variation in the
comparison states of New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. These estimates are robust to Massachusetts when it comes to specific shocks and
differential trends in SSDI beneficiaries’ rate between Massachusetts and other states.

4.1 Within Massachusetts analysis
I first analyze the effect of the reform by comparing the number of SSDI beneficiaries before and
after the health reform within Massachusetts, controlling for a number of characteristics of
individuals that could affect preferences for applying for SSDI. Second, I exploit the variation
across SSDI beneficiaries among married couples to identify the causal effect of the reform on
SSDI beneficiaries. The basic models are of the forms:

SSDI = α + β*T2 + δ*X + u (1)
Spouse w/o ESI = α + β*T2 + δ*X + u (2)

In this specification, SSDI and Spouse w/o ESI are the outcomes of interest. SSDI is a dummy
variable indicating the age to begin receiving Social Security Disability payments because of
his/her disability while Spouse w/o ESI indicates an individual who does not have insurance
through their spouses’ group/employer plan. T2 is an indicator to capture the average effect of
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the health reform on the SSDI beneficiaries/ Spouse w/o ESI rolls. The vector of control
variables, X, represents individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics including
ages, sex group, education levels, and race.

P (SSDI=1|x) = F (β0 + β1 (Spouse w/o ESI) + β2T2+ β3T2· (Spouse w/o ESI) + δ*X)

(3)

When subjects in a treatment group and a control group are observed in both the pre-treatment
and post-treatment periods and the pre-treatment time trends in the outcome variable, SSDI rolls,
are not significantly different in the two groups, DD models can be used to estimate the effect of
the treatment on the treated. One way to specify the model is by defining a variable T2 that is
equal to one if the observation is from the post-treatment period, and zero if from the pretreatment period, and a variable Spouse w/o ESI that is equal to one if the observation is from the
treatment group and zero if from the control group.
The preference for SSDI arises from variations across age, sex group, education level,
and race. Obviously each of these dimensions is correlated with preferences for SSDI, so the
regression for every category could be controlled. Therefore, in this specification, identification
comes from the variation in the treatment group within these categories. That is, this approach
uses the fact that the health reform changes for the spouse with ESI versus the spouse without
ESI over time.
Next, a more aggregate approach is taken to look at the effect of health reform on the
change of SSDI beneficiaries during a seven-year period. That is, a sample of SSDI beneficiaries
is taken from 2003 to 2009. After pooling all data across years, the estimates are reliable and
precise, and the results are consistent across years.
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This paper mainly focuses on the married sample. Before looking at the results from the
married sample, we need to look at the whole sample to verify the generality of the estimation.
Further, I generate SSDI beneficiaries’ rates per-capita by dividing the number of SSDI
beneficiaries in a given year by the SSA's estimated county population. Consequently, I compare
the percentage change of SSDI beneficiaries between SIPP and SSA data during the pre- and
post- reform period. Thus, the panel A of Table 2.2 presents the estimates of equation (1) for the
whole sample to show that the SSDI beneficiaries from SIPP significantly increase by between
0.358 (un-weighted) and 0.561 (weighted) percentage points which are close to the percentage
change of SSDI beneficiaries (0.55 percentage points) from SSA (see the appendix).
Next, for the married sample, panel B shows that the SSDI beneficiaries increase
significantly by 0.4 percentage points while the group of spouses without ESI increases by 4.38
percentage points significantly after the health reform. The percentage change among SSDI
beneficiaries, and spouses without ESI, helps calculate the elasticity between these two groups.
A 0.4 percent increase in SSDI beneficiaries is associated with a 4.38 percent increase in spouses
without ESI coverage, which translates into an elasticity estimate of 0.0913.
Lastly, in order to estimate the impact of the ESI expansion on SSDI participation
decision in Massachusetts, I investigate the behavior of SSDI potential applicants in treatment
group in a regression framework using equation (3). I expect to see the positive significant
coefficients on interaction term because more intensive ESI expansion from the health reform
may have led potential SSDI applicants who are affected by ESI to have much more incentive to
move onto SSDI rolls. Panel C presents estimates of the effect on the treatment group after the
health reform for the rate of SSDI beneficiaries ages 18 to 64. As expected, the coefficients of
interest are positive and significantly different from zero. Moreover, the marginal effect is
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0.0098. That is, a 1 percent increase in the group of spouses without ESI, and means that the
SSDI beneficiaries will increase by 0.0098 percent. Recalled from panel A, the group of spouses
without ESI increased by 4.38 percent which means the predicted SSDI beneficiaries will
increase by 4.38*0.0098 percent=0.0429 percent which accounts for 10.73 percent
(0.000429/0.004=0.1073) of total SSDI beneficiaries increase.

4.2 The impact of health reform on Massachusetts across states
In order to estimate the effect of health reform on Massachusetts compared to other neighboring
states, extended version of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are estimated:

SSDI= β0+ β1MA+ β2T2+ β3MA·T2+ δ*X + u

(4)

Spouse w/o ESI = β0+ β1MA+ β2T2+ β3MA·T2+ δ*X + u

(5)

The dummy variable, MA representing Massachusetts, captures possible differences between the
treatment and control state which is a non-policy state. The coefficient of interest is now β3, the
coefficient on the interaction term. The variable, T2·MA, is the same as a dummy variable equal
to one for those observations in the treatment state in the second period.
Table 2.3 demonstrates effects on the treatment state after health reform for the
percentage of SSDI beneficiaries whose ages from 18 to 64 and the percentage of spouse without
ESI. For the whole sample after health reform, panel A shows that the percentage change of
SSDI beneficiaries increased by 0.48 percent to 0.59 percent while the percentage change of
spouses without ESI increased by 0.84 percent to 3.16 percent. Additionally, these estimates are
all significant at the 1 percent level. Next, for the married sample after health reform, panel B
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shows that the percentage change of SSDI beneficiaries increased by 0.24 percent to 1.15 percent
while the percentage change of spouses without ESI increased by 1.76 percent to 3.49 percent.
As expected, the coefficients of interest are positive and significantly different from zero. I use
three different numbers of control states to see if the results consistently show that these two
groups increased significantly after health reform.

4.3 Omitted factors
The “differences-in-differences” identification strategy of Eq. (3) would be sufficient if there
were no other Massachusetts-specific shocks and differential trends in SSDI beneficiaries’ rate
between Massachusetts and other states. But it is difficult to control for these trends and shocks
that are changing at the same time. Therefore, I extend the analysis by comparing the DD
estimate on the potential SSDI applicants who are affected by ESI expansion to an analogous DD
estimate on the potential SSDI applicants who are not affected by ESI expansion using a DDD
framework.

SSDI=α0+ α1MA+α2 (Spouse w/o ESI) +α3MA· (Spouse w/o ESI) + β0T2+ β1T2·MA+
β2T2· (Spouse w/o ESI) + β3T2·MA· (Spouse w/o ESI) + δ*X + u

(6)

In this “differences-in-differences-in-differences” model, the triple interaction term among T2,
MA, and Spouse w/o ESI measures the specific effect of ESI expansion on those who are
potential SSDI applicants in Massachusetts after health reform and β3 measures the causal impact
of the health reform on the change of SSDI rolls.
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Table 2.4 presents the results from estimating Eq. (6) for the full sample and the married
sample respectively. It demonstrates estimates of the treatment group in the treatment state
during the treatment period (after health reform) for the percentage of SSDI beneficiaries whose
ages are from 18 to 64; it shows the percentage change of SSDI beneficiaries increased by
between 1.14 percent to 1.37 percent, and these estimates are all significant at the 1 percent level.
As expected, the coefficients of interest are positive and significantly different from zero. This
specification better controls for Massachusetts-specific shocks and differential trends in SSDI
beneficiaries’ rate between Massachusetts and other states because these estimates rely on this
DDD model.

4.4 Robustness checks
I use a placebo test to estimate the effect of the reform as if it had occurred in other states or
during another time. This test allows me to evaluate how likely it is to find a “false positive”
when studying the Massachusetts health reform. If I were to find a significant effect even in
states/time that had not enacted a major health care reform, it would signal that the effects
estimated in Massachusetts may be spurious. I perform these placebo tests using the comparison
states (New Jersey and Pennsylvania). In addition, I perform these placebo tests using false
implement time of health reform, e.g. 2004 and 2005. Specifically, I use the following models to
estimate:

y= γ0+ γ1STATE+ γ2T2+ γ3STATE·T2+ u

(7)

y= γ0+ γ1MA+ γ2TIME+ γ3MA·TIME+ u

(8)

55
The dummy variable, STATE representing the false treatment state, captures possible differences
between the treatment and control states prior to the policy change. The coefficient of interest is
now γ3, the coefficient on the interaction term, T2·STATE. On the other hand, the dummy variable,
TIME representing the false treatment time, captures possible differences between the treatment
and control period prior to the policy change. The coefficient of interest is now γ3, the coefficient
on the interaction term, MA·TIME.
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows that the false treatment state, New Jersey, doesn’t have a
significant effect while Pennsylvania even has a negative significant effect which makes the
main results even more credible. The absence of an effect in the placebo states provides some
evidence that the results presented in the main text are due to the law in Massachusetts rather
than a random fluctuation in SSDI beneficiaries’ rate. In panel B, I use two false treatment times
to further check whether there is any health reform effect happening at during a fictitious time.
The results show that either there is no effect or there is negative significant effect, which
confirms the change of SSDI beneficiaries is mainly from Massachusetts health reform.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
Congressional Budget Office, 2010 shows that a SSDI beneficiary had on average $10,500 in
Medicare health costs, which is equivalent to more than 80 percent of the average yearly SSDI
cash benefit in 2009. Therefore, the Medicare coverage is particularly valuable to these disabled
individuals. Thus, the 2006 Massachusetts health reform is likely to influence the application
rates for SSDI benefits, but whether it will result in more or fewer beneficiaries is unclear.
This paper finds that the positive effect of the ESI expansion on SSDI participation is
0.98 percentage points stronger for spouses without ESI than it is for spouses with ESI. These
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estimates imply spouses without ESI are associated with higher SSDI beneficiaries which
accounts for a 10.7 percentage point increase in SSDI beneficiaries in Massachusetts after the
reform. Moreover, the estimates imply an elasticity of spouses without ESI with respect to SSDI
beneficiaries of 0.0913. The calculations also suggest that the health reform was more expensive
than it might first appear because of an increase in SSDI expenditure.
From a policy point of view this study is interesting. Providing the health insurance
coverage to individuals creates stopgap forms of health coverage for potential SSDI beneficiaries.
Those with an alternative source of coverage are more likely to apply to the program than those
without such an alternative. These findings have several important welfare implications. First,
they suggest that providing insurance coverage to potential SSDI applicants will not reduce
uninsured people too much in the U.S. Indeed, it would only substitute private health insurance
with public health insurance.
Second, providing insurance during the waiting period may encourage potential
applicants to apply for SSDI. However, these increased applications are difficult to assess the
welfare implications. Gruber and Kubik (2002) provide a detailed discussion about welfare
implications regarding how health insurance affects different disabled applicants. For example, if
the additional applications are from the least disabled applicants, then it might suggest little
inefficiency in health reform expenditure; however, if the increased applications are from the
most disabled applicants, then it could lead to significant welfare gains by helping disabled
applicants who cannot bear the risk of going without coverage for any period of time. Future
work could assess the underlying disability status of those SSDI applicants to improve our ability
to explain and manage the increasing costs of the SSDI programs in terms of new beneficiaries
and the size of future caseloads.
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Appendix for Chapter 2.
SSA population data and disabled beneficiaries ages 18-64
Calendar year

Source

2003

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2003 Table 8.

2004

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2004 Table 8.

2005

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2005 Table 8.

2006

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2006 Table 8.

2007

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2007 Table 8.

2008

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2008 Table 8.

2009

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2009 Table 8.

58
References for Chapter 2
Ai, Chunrong, Norton, Edward C., 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics
Letters 80 (1), 123-129.
Autor, David H., Duggan, Mark G., 2006. The growth in the social security disability rolls: a
fiscal crisis unfolding. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (3), 71-96.
Congressional Budget Office, 2010. Social security disability insurance: participation trends and
their fiscal implications.
Gruber, Jonathan, Kubik, Jeffrey D., 2002. Health insurance coverage and the disability
insurance application decision. NBER Working Paper #9148, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA.
Gruber, Jonathan, 2008. Massachusetts health care reform: the view from one year out. Risk
Management and Insurance Review 11 (1), 51-63.
Lischko, A., Bachman, Sara S., Vangeli, Alyssa., 2009. The Massachusetts commonwealth
health insurance connector: structure and functions. The Commonwealth Fund . (Retrieved
May 22nd, 2013, from http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/IssueBriefs/2009/May/The-Massachusetts-Commonwealth-Health-Insurance-Connector.aspx).
Raymond, Alan G., 2007. The 2006 Massachusetts health care reform law: progress and
challenges after one year of implementation. Massachusetts Health Policy Forum.
U.S. Census Bureau, 2009. SIPP USERS Guide. (Retrieved May 22nd, 2013, from
http://www.census.gov/sipp/usrguide.html).

59
Table 2.1 Summary statistics
SSDI rolls (weighted)
Variable
Mean

Treatment period (08-09)

Control period (03-05)

USA

MA

USA

MA

1.42%

3.33%

1.37%

2.44%

Age

54.84

(12.46)

52.59

(11.86)

54.65

(11.9)

52.48

(10.51)

Female (%)

47.67

(49.94)

48.38

(50.01)

51.4

(49.98)

59.87

(49.04)

(43.3)

16.12

(36.81)

26

(43.88)

11.02

(31.34)

(3.1)

39.01

(2.99)

38.86

(3.13)

39.03

(3.62)

(49.03)

18.27

(38.68)

41.11

(49.2)

23

(42.1)

Nonwhite (%)
Education
Married

25
39.2
40.23

n
15,557
558
34,944
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; MA=Massachusetts.
Source: 2004 Full Panel and 2008 wave1-10 of Survey of Income and Program Participation

952
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Table 2.2 Estimates within Massachusetts (MA)
Pre vs. Post within MA weighted (03-05 vs. 08-09)
Panel A: Full sample
SSDI
SIPP
SSA
weighted
un-weighted
Health reform effect
0.0056*** 0.0058*** 0.0035***
0.004***
0.0055***
Robust S.E
[0.0008]
[0.0008]
[0.0008]
[0.0008]
[0.00099]
Control covariates
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
101,182
101,182
5
Panel B: Married sample
SSDI
Spouse w/o ESI
Elasticity
weighted
weighted
Health reform effect
0.0042*** 0.004***
0.04793*** 0.0438*** 0.0913
Robust S.E
[0.0012]
[0.0012]
[0.0052]
[0.0049]
Control covariates
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
39,036
39,036
Panel C: Married sample
DD within MA
SSDI rolls (Logit)
ME
ME
Health reform effect
1.6001***
0.0087***
1.6213***
0.0098***
Robust S.E
[0.4477]
(0.0018)
[0.448]
(0.0022)
Control covariates
No
Yes
Observations
39,036
39,036
Notes: 1. robust standard errors in square brackets. ME: Marginal effect based on Ai and Norton, 2003.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
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Table 2.3 Difference-in-Difference estimates between Massachusetts and neighboring states
DD (weighted) (03-05 vs. 08-09)
SSDI rolls
Spouse w/o ESI
Panel A: Full sample
6 control states
n=432,532
n=432,532
0 .0051*** (0.0009) 0.0261***
(0.0027)
4 control states
n=188,162
n=188,162
0 .0059*** (0.0011) 0 .0084*** (0.0034)
2 control states
n=345,552
n=345,552
0.0048***
(0.001)
0.0316***
(0.0028)
Panel B: Married sample
6 control states
n=169,630
0.0024*

(0.0015)

n=169,630
0.0303***

(0.0063)

(0.0015)

n=73,834
0 .0176**

(0.0077)

(0.0016)

n=134,832
0.0349***

(0.0065)

4 control states
n=73,834
0 .0115***
2 control states
n=134,832
0.00007

Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
6 control states=NH, VT, RI, CT, NJ, and PA
4 control states=NH, VT, RI, and CT
2 control states= NJ, and PA
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
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Table 2.4 Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference estimates
DDD (weighted) (03-05 vs. 08-09)
SSDI rolls
Full sample
Married sample
6 control states
n=432,532
n=169,630
0.0129***
[0.002]
0.0113***
[0.0025]
4 control states
n=188,162
n=73,834
0.0077***
[0.0035]
0.005
[0.0033]
2 control states
n=345,552
n=134,832
0.0147***
[0.0022]
0.0136***
[0.0028]
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors in square brackets.
6 control states=NH, VT, RI, CT, NJ, and PA
4 control states=NH, VT, RI, and CT
2 control states= NJ, and PA
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
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Table 2.5 Robustness checks
Panel A: False treatment state
DD within
SSDI (Logit)
ME
Pennsylvania
-0.0008
-0.4102**
(0.0027)
[0.1807]

New Jersey
0.1472
[0.1782]

Health reform effect
Robust S.E
Control covariates
Observations

Yes
48,496

ME
-0.0057**
(0.0028)

Yes
47,300

Panel B: False treatment time

Health reform effect
Robust S.E
Control covariates
Observations

Pre vs. Post within MA (weighted )
SSDI
(03-04 vs. 05-09)
(03 vs. 04-09)
-0.0005
-0.00067
-0.0088***
-0.0092***
[0.0009]
[0.0009]
[0.0021]
[0.0029]
No
Yes
No
Yes
39,036
39,036

Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in square brackets. ME: Marginal effect based on Ai and Norton, 2003.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
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Table 2.A1 SSDI rolls aged 18-64 form SSA
Massachusetts

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

157,173

163,210

169514

174,940

180,907

188,327

196,040

4,089,322

4,097,973

4,087,881

4,132,347

4,157,960

4,199,836

4,266,071

3.84%
Source: SSA administrative data

3.98%

4.15%

4.23%

4.35%

4.48%

4.60%

Beneficiaries
Resident population
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CHAPTER 3. How Did the Massachusetts Health Reform Affect the SSI-disabled Program?

1. Introduction
In the U.S., the public health insurance is particularly important to the people who have
difficulties purchasing private health insurance coverage. Usually, the public health insurance is
closely tied to the eligibility for the federal disability programs such as Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). For example, SSDI beneficiaries
receive Medicare while SSI beneficiaries receive Medicaid. These programs require a rigorous
screening process for disability and the applicants usually need to show that they are physically
incapable of finding suitable jobs. Therefore, the recipients typically choose to withdraw from
the labor force in order to obtain the public health insurance coverage. These scenarios may lead
to potential employment disincentives for working-age people with disabilities.
However, after the 2006 Massachusetts health reform, the public health insurance
expansion creates significant employment incentives for potential SSI applicants. Several
observations support the idea that expanding insurance coverage will reduce welfare program
participation. First, the fully phased-in Medicaid reforms increased the probability of working in
the labor force by 0.9 percentage points and Medicaid expansion reduced the probability of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program participation by 1.2 percentage points
(Yelowitz, 1995). Second, the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) program reduced SSI
participation for the elderly (Yelowitz, 2000). Third, the Medicaid buy-in can break or weaken
the link between health insurance and SSI eligibility for people with disabilities (Goodman et al.,
2007) and, particularly in Massachusetts where the percentage of buy-in program enrollees
working above substantial gainful activity is more than 60 percent (Hanes and Folkman, 2003).
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Expanding insurance coverage could reduce SSI-disabled applicants’ incentive by providing
Medicaid and by maintaining their current jobs without withdrawing from the labor force.
There is a voluminous amount of literature to support the argument that expanding
publicly subsidized health insurance leads to reduced welfare participation. However, there is
little evidence about how insurance influences the SSI-disabled program participation and, more
specifically, whether initial SSI-disability claims are affected. This is an important shortcoming
in the literature because part of the support for expanding publicly subsidized health insurance
comes from the belief that it will be de-linking health insurance and SSI eligibility.
I estimate the causal effect of the reform on SSI application decisions using three
administrative data sources (Social Security Administration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services and U.S. Cancer Statistics) and one national survey database, March Current Population
Survey. Collecting data from these sources allow me to investigate the change before and after
the implementation of health reform on the caseload of initial claims of SSI-disabled claimants,
Medicaid recipients, cancer incidence counts and SSI-disabled beneficiaries.
I evaluate the effect of the Medicaid expansion on the change of initial SSI claim rate
using the near-universal expansion of health insurance coverage in Massachusetts. In 2006,
Massachusetts simultaneously mandated that all state residents must have insurance (or lose a
personal income tax exemption with additional monthly penalties) and dramatically increased
free and subsidized insurance for low- and middle-income residents. I perform a behavioral
analysis that exploits the variation in the intensity of the impact of the reform across SSIdisabled applicants.
Potential SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by the Medicaid expansion will have
much less incentive to move onto SSI rolls than their counterparts who are not affected by the
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Medicaid expansion. Additionally, I compare potential SSI-disabled applicants in Massachusetts
to similar counterparts in the neighboring states that do not implement health reform. Exploiting
the variation in treatment intensity allows me to identify how expanding public insurance
coverage affected the initial SSI claim rate in a way that is robust to Massachusetts-specific time
trends.
I have several findings. I find that the health reform reduced the initial SSI claim rate by
0.098 percent (equivalent to 11.66 percent of total claims in 2008 Massachusetts). The result
suggests that the initial SSI claim rate is quite sensitive to insurance status. These results also
show that Medicaid-disabled expenditure can be saved around 1 percent and suggest
inefficiencies in Medicaid-disabled expenditure in Massachusetts. However, spending $1 on the
Medicaid-disabled could save $0.016 for individuals who get into SSI for the first time and
$0.032 for individuals who receive SSI for multiple spells.
These findings have consequences for the cost of health care reform. Expanding
eligibility for Medicaid could result in reduced expenditures for the current SSI program by
giving potential disabled applicants less incentive to apply for SSI. Reducing caseloads could
reduce current SSI expenditures and increase taxable revenue due to an increase in work hours. If
Medicaid is an important determinant of the volume of SSI applications, then offering health
insurance without participating in SSI may reduce total cost. This could happen when disabled
adults are willing to forgo the cash benefits from SSI.
The rest of the paper is laid out in five sections. Section 2 gives an overview of the SSI
program in the US and the Medicaid expansion in Massachusetts. This is followed by Section 3,
which discusses the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results for the impact of
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health reform on public insurance coverage, while Section 5 shows the results for the impact of
health reform on SSI participation decisions. Section 6 concludes.

2. Supplemental security income, Medicaid expansion, and the 2006 Massachusetts reform
For the purposes of SSI eligibility, disabled individuals are those ‘unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity (SGA) because of a medically determined physical or mental
impairment expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a
continuous period of at least 12 months.’ Eligibility for benefits is determined on a monthly basis.
SSI recipients are required to have their nonmedical eligibility factors reviewed periodically (e.g.
every 1 to 6 years), depending on their situation. In addition to the nonmedical reviews, medical
reviews are conducted on disabled recipients to determine whether or not they continue to be
disabled, and are performed most frequently on disabled recipients whose medical conditions are
considered likely to improve. Medical reviews are required for disabled recipients when earnings
of recipients exceed the SGA level.
As for Medicaid eligibility, certain qualifications must be met regarding age, whether
applicants are pregnant or disabled; applicants’ income and resources; and whether applicants are
U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted immigrants. The rules for calculating applicants’ income and
resources vary from state to state and from group to group. Assets and resources are also tested
against established thresholds. Categorically needy persons who are eligible for Medicaid may or
may not also receive cash assistance from the SSI program. Because of excessive medical
expenses, medically needy persons who would be categorically eligible except for income or
assets may become eligible for Medicaid.
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Due to health reform in Massachusetts, individuals eligible under the Medicaid
Demonstration program can have access to health care services through several pathways. The
mandatory and optional Medicaid State plan populations determine their eligibility by reviewing
the applicable Medicaid laws and regulations. State plan eligibilities are included in the Medicaid
Demonstration program in order to generate savings to provide benefits to expansion populations.
Table 3.1 lists all SSI potential qualifiers for applicants ages 19 to 64 who might get Medicaid
via MassHealth without applying for SSI under the pre- and post-reform guidelines (the
MassHealth Medicaid Demonstration defines 18-year-olds as children). These groups in Table
3.1 can increase their earning level without losing public insurance and avoid the wait involved
in a SSI application if they value Medicaid more than cash assistance.

3. Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data
First, Social Security Administration (SSA) refers to the first filing as an “initial claim” when a
state agency first reviews a claim for disability benefits. For the initial claim rate of SSI from
SSA, this dataset only includes disability claims sent to a state agency for determining disability
criteria. Disability claims that do not meet the non-disability criteria are normally denied
without being sent to a state agency. If SSA determines that non-disability criteria were not met
while a claim is pending in a state agency, then claims pending in a state agency will be returned
to SSA without a determination.
Second, SSA refers to simultaneous as a “concurrent claim” filing when the same person
files a SSI claim and a Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) disability claim. When an
applicant applies for both SSI and SSDI benefits, that claim is normally counted only once
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because both types of claims are processed together. The division of claims between SSI and
concurrent claims can provide the socioeconomic backgrounds of applicants. SSI applicants do
not have a recent work history, and have little or no income and resources. Concurrent applicants
have a recent work history, but also have scant income and resources. Claims filing analysis can
be accomplished by comparing concurrent cases, SSI cases, and aggregate SSI cases.
Third, U.S. Cancer Statistics (USCS) is the official federal collection of statistics on
cancer incidence from registries with high-quality data for the United States. Incidence data are
provided by The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Program of Cancer
Registries. Cancer incidence data are available for the United States and individual states by age
group, race, gender, childhood cancer classifications, and cancer site for the years 1999 to 2008.
Fourth, Current Population Survey (CPS) is a nationally representative household survey
of the US civilian, noninstitutionalized population, collecting monthly information on labor
market characteristics. In addition to those data, the CPS includes an Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC), conducted mostly in March, which collects detailed information
on income and health insurance coverage. With an annual sample size of about 60,000
households, the CPS ASEC provides relatively large samples for many states, including
Massachusetts. However, given the focus on a small group of the population, the sample size for
this analysis is relatively small.

3.2 Empirical strategy
This analysis takes advantage of the “natural experiment” that occurred in Massachusetts to
compare the change in the initial claim rate of SSI-disabled applicants ages 18 to 64 before and
after the state implemented its health reform initiative, while using Difference-in-Difference (DD)
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and Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) methods. The estimation approach exploits
variation over time (comparing pre-and post-reform time periods), across population groups
(comparing SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by Medicaid expansion to SSI-disabled
applicants who are not affected by Medicaid expansion), and across states (comparing
Massachusetts to comparison states in the Northeast that did not implement health reform).
This paper relies on three administrative data sets from 2003 to 2008 for the caseload of
initial claims of SSI-disabled claimants from SSA, Medicaid recipients from Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and cancer incidence counts from USCS combined with
population data from the Census Bureau (CB) to construct panel data and one national survey
database, March CPS. I rely on data for 2004-2008 from 2005-2009 CPS.
Defining the SSI Beneficiaries-Disabled Status14—CPS respondents are asked in March to
report the reason why they received SSI benefits over the prior calendar year. In the CPS,
individuals are classified as SSI-disabled beneficiaries only if they report having SSI benefits at
any point over the prior calendar year because they were disabled. However, the SSI-disabled
beneficiary rate in the CPS aligns more closely to point-in-time estimates than full-year estimates.
Defining the Pre-and Post-Reform Periods—Since these datasets were calculated based
on “Calendar year,” I am limited in my ability to align the pre-and post-reform periods with the
exact timing of reform implementation. Therefore, I define the pre-and post-reform periods
based on the year, rather than the month, that Massachusetts implemented reform. Even though
some of the initial reform efforts went into effect in October 2006, my post-reform period using
the SSA, USCS, CMS, and CPS begins in 2007. After defining the pre-and post-reform periods, I

14

The question reads, “What were the reasons (you/name) (Was/were) getting supplemental security income last year?” The five
coded responses are: “Disabled (adult or child),” “Blind (adult or child),” “On behalf of a disabled child,” “On behalf of a blind
child,” “Other (adult or child),” For disabled beneficiaries, I restrict the attention on Disabled (adult or child).
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then compared the initial claim rate of SSI-disabled applicants, incidence rate of cancer patients,
percentage of Medicaid recipients, and SSI-disabled beneficiaries in the post-reform period of
2007–2008 to those applicants, patients, recipients, and beneficiaries in the pre-reform period of
2003–2004.
Defining the Comparison States—The comparison states provide an estimate of what
would have happened in Massachusetts in the absence of health reform. Identifying an
appropriate comparison state is difficult given the wide variation in state policies, programs and
populations, and the frequency with which other states were also implementing program and
policy changes that affected SSI-disabled applicants over the study period. In this paper, I rely on
four states in the New England division (1.New Hampshire, 2.Vermont, 3.Rhode Island,
4.Connecticut) and two states in the Middle Atlantic division (5.New Jersey, 6.Pennsylvania) in
the Northeast region as the comparison states.
Defining the Comparison Group—The comparison group provides an estimate of what
would have happened in the absence of the Medicaid expansion within Massachusetts. Potential
control groups include SSI-Disabled Children (SSI-DC) and people who have been diagnosed
with cancer. Due to comprehensive Medicaid expansion for children in Massachusetts, I will not
use SSI-DC as the control group because SSI-DC might be affected significantly. To focus more
on adults instead, I decide to use cancer patients ages 20 to 64 (USCS divides age categories into
5-year blocks, so 20-24 is the youngest data block which only covers adults). Since the age range
between the control group and the treatment group is similar, these two groups should be more
comparable. The control group includes all genders, all ethnicities, all races, and all types of
cancer.
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To estimate the overall impact of health reform on SSI-disabled applicants, using a DD
framework I compared the change in the initial claim rate of SSI-disabled claimants in
Massachusetts to the change in the initial claim rate for a similar group in a comparison state
before and after the reform. The comparison states control for underlying trends in the initial
claim rate of SSI-disabled unrelated to health reform. Furthermore, I extend the analysis by
comparing the DD estimate on the potential SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by
Medicaid expansion to an analogous DD estimate on the potential SSI-disabled applicants who
are not affected by the Medicaid expansion using a DDD framework.

3.2.1 DDD estimate
I will label the two time periods as one and two, let MA represent the state implementing the
policy, and let Medicaid denote the potential SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by
Medicaid expansion. The coefficient of interest is now π3, the coefficient on the triple interaction
term, T2·MA·Medicaid.

y= α0+ α1MA+ α2Medicaid+ α3MA·Medicaid + π0T2+ π1T2·MA+ π2T2·Medicaid +
π3T2·MA·Medicaid+u (1)

where y is the outcome of interest. The dummy variable, Medicaid, captures possible differences
between the treatment and control group. The time period dummy, T2, captures aggregate factors
that would cause changes in y even in the absence of a policy change. The dummy variable, MA,
captures possible differences between the treatment and control state, which is non-policy state.
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3.2.2 DD estimate across states
If I drop the Medicaid terms from Eq. (1), I will obtain the DD estimate described in the
following:

y= β0+ β1MA+ β2T2+ β3MA·T2+ u (2)

The coefficient of interest is now β3, the coefficient on the interaction term, T2·MA, which is the
same as a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the treatment state in the second
period.

3.2.3 DD estimate within Massachusetts
On the other hand, if I drop the MA terms from Eq. (1), I will get another DD estimate displayed
in the following:

y= δ0+ δ1Medicaid+ δ2T2+ δ3Medicaid·T2+ u

(3)

The coefficient of interest is now δ3, the coefficient on the interaction term, Medicaid·T2, which
is the same as a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the treatment group in the
second period.

4. The impact of the 2006 health reform on public insurance coverage
Table 3.2 presents the percentage of Medicaid recipients across states and years. The percentages
of all states rise gradually by year, except Massachusetts, which increase by 7.82 percent from
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2003 to 2008. By constructing panel data with this information and running regression analysis, I
further investigate the percentage change of Medicaid recipients in the treatment state in a
regression framework using Eq. (2), and expect to see positive significant coefficients because
more intensive health reform can be anticipated to raise incentives to get Medicaid since state
governments are expanding eligibility and providing premium subsidies to potential applicants.
Table 3.4 demonstrates estimates of the interaction term between the “treatment state”
and “after health reform” for the percentage of Medicaid recipients for all adults. As expected, in
column 2, the coefficients of interest are positive and significantly different from zero.

5. The impact of the 2006 health reform on initial SSI claim rate
5.1 The effect of Medicaid expansion on SSI-disabled claimants
Table 3.3 lists the caseload of initial claims for SSI-disabled and resident populations ages 18 to
64. Then I calculate the initial claim rate by dividing the caseloads by the corresponding
population. In Table 3.3, only the percentage for Massachusetts decreases by 0.13 percent from
2003 to 2008. One potential explanation is that from 2005 to 2008, the economy was booming
which might make the potential SSI-disabled applicants not apply due to higher opportunity cost.
Therefore, I use the DD estimate across states to eliminate the business cycle factor between
states and reveal the effect of health reform on SSI-disabled applicants.
Next, with the initial claim rate across states and years, I can construct panel data and
proceed to assess the behavior of SSI-disabled applicants in the treatment state in a regression
framework using Eq. (2). Table 3.4 shows estimates of the interaction term between the
“treatment state” and “after health reform” for the initial claim rate of SSI-disabled applicants
ages 18 to 64. In column 1, surprisingly, for initial claim rate of SSI-disabled applicants, the
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coefficient of interest is negative and significantly different from zero. These findings suggest
that potential SSI-disabled applicants ages 18 to 64 might have significantly less incentive to
apply for SSI after health reform.
In the SSI program, reasons for applying for SSI might be to gain access to cash
assistance and Medicaid. Therefore, scenarios explaining the significant caseload decline include
the following possibilities. First, if potential disabled applicants have relatively higher incomes,
they may not have enough incentive to apply because the cash assistance does not attract them.
Second, these applicants may only need Medicaid without cash benefits because they value
health insurance more. During the reform, Massachusetts expanded Medicaid income eligibility
comprehensively and provided premium subsidies to both qualifying small employers and their
low-income employees for the purchase of private health insurance. Thus, these applicants might
have less incentive to apply for SSI because they can get Medicaid easily without participating in
SSI.

5.2 March Current Population Survey results
After using DD and DDD estimators to confirm the hypotheses via information from the
administrative database, I apply CPS-ASEC to assess the behavior of SSI-disabled beneficiaries
ages 18 to 64 in the treatment state in a regression framework using Eq. (2). I expect to see that
the coefficients should be negative because the caseload of initial claims of SSI-disabled
applicants dropped significantly, which might make the number of SSI-disabled beneficiaries
decrease. These results suggest that more intensive health reform might have led individuals to
have less incentive to apply for SSI. Table 3.4 presents estimates of the interaction term between
the “treatment state” and “after health reform” for the SSI-disabled beneficiaries. As expected, in
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column 3, SSI-disabled beneficiaries, the coefficients of interest are negative and significantly
different from zero.

5.3 Labor force participation for low skill workers
Since Massachusetts implemented near-universal health reform, especially the expansion
of Medicaid income eligibility, I expected to see that the rate of labor force participation for low
skill workers increase, and potential SSI-disabled applicants have less incentive to apply for SSI,
which was confirmed by the results in Table 3.4. Next, Table 3.5 confirms that the labor force
participation of low skill workers in Massachusetts increased.
For example, in the Northeast region, Massachusetts is the only state in which both the
number of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) participants with work
requirements and the number of TANF participants who met work requirements increased
significantly from 19 percent in FY2007 to 45.1 percent in FY2008, which is much higher than
the national average (29.8 percent in FY 2008). Moreover, the results indicate that the Deficit
Reduction Act (DRA)’s reauthorized TANF with changes in the work requirement in 2007 may
not be the main reason for the increased labor force participation of low-income families. Both
the number of TANF participants with work requirements and the number of TANF participants
who met work requirements in other neighboring states decreased significantly except in Rhode
Island, where the number of TANF participants with work requirements increased slightly.

5.4 Within Massachusetts analysis
Next, I want to further investigate the effect of Medicaid expansion on SSI-disabled applicants
by using the control group to see if the Medicaid expansion made the caseload of SSI-disabled
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applicants drop. This group could be the potential SSI-disabled applicants and this group is not
affected by the Medicaid expansion, which means that the percentage of this group should not
grow significantly.
In Table 3.6, I use the incidence counts divided by the approximate population ages 18 to
64 to get the incidence rate across states and years. Due to a lack of data in USCS, I was unable
to get the data for Vermont for ages between 25-29 in 2005 and 2006, and 20-24 in 2004.
Connecticut was not included in the national data.
Therefore, in order to estimate the impact of the Medicaid expansion in Massachusetts, I
investigate the behavior of SSI-disabled applicants in the treatment group in a regression
framework using Eq. (3). Thus, I compare changes over time in initial claim rates of SSIdisabled applicants ages 18 to 64 to changes over time in incidence rate of cancer in patients ages
20 to 64. I expect to see negative significant coefficients because a more intensive Medicaid
expansion might have led potential SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by Medicaid to
have much less incentive to move onto SSI rolls. Table 3.7 presents estimates of the interaction
term between the “treatment group” and “after health reform” for the initial claim rate of SSIdisabled applicants ages 18 to 64. As expected, the coefficients of interest are negative and
significantly different from zero. This coefficient shows that the total claims were reduced by
11.66 percent.15 This table also shows that Medicaid-disabled expenditure can be saved up to
$37.45 million, which is 0.82 percent and suggests inefficiencies in the Medicaid-disabled
expenditure in Massachusetts.16 However, spending $1 on the Medicaid-disabled could save
$0.016 for individuals who get into SSI for the first time and $0.032 for individuals who receive

15

(0.00098/0.0084)*100%=11.66%
$9,100*0.098%*4.2M=37.45M; Medicaid Payments per Enrollee-Disabled in Massachusetts:9,100, FY 2008 available online
at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=183&cat=4&rgn=23&cmprgn=1; $37.45M/$4,571M=0.82%; Medicaid
Payments of Disabled group in Massachusetts: $4,571 Million, FY 2008 available online at
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cmprgn=1&cat=4&rgn=23&ind=858&sub=47
16
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SSI for multiple spells (See appendix A for description of calculation).17 This indicates that it
results in saving but that is not much in the grand scheme of government expenditures. The net
cost of between Medicaid-disabled program and SSI-disabled program would be 4494.06 Million
(4,571-76.94).
Furthermore, I want to confirm the results of Table 3.7 by looking at what happens to
SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by the Medicaid expansion in the treatment state after
health reform via a regression framework using Eq. (1). I expect to see that the coefficients
should be negative. These results will confirm that following the health reform in the treatment
state and in the treatment group, potential SSI-disabled applicants ages 18 to 64 might have less
incentive to apply for SSI. Column 2 of Table 3.7 presents estimates of the triple interaction term
among “treatment state”, “treatment group”, and “after health reform” for the initial claim rate of
SSI-disabled applicants ages 18 to 64. As expected, the coefficient of interest is negative.

5.5 Robustness checks
As a placebo test, I estimate the effect of the reform as if it had occurred in other states. This test
allows me to evaluate how likely it is to find a “false positive” when studying the Massachusetts
reform. If I were to find a significant effect even in states that had not enacted a major health
care reform, it would signal that the effects estimated in Massachusetts might be spurious. I
perform these placebo tests using the SSA and CMS from the comparison states of New
Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Specifically, I
estimate

17
$7,528*0.098%*45.15%*5.5*4.2M=76.94M; 76.94/4,571=0.0168; $7,528*0.098%*45.15%*10.5*4.2M=146.89M;
146.89/4,571=0.0321
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y= γ0+ γ1STATE+ γ2T2+ γ3STATE·T2+ u

(4)

The dummy variable, STATE, captures possible differences between the treatment and control
states prior to the policy change. The coefficient of interest is now γ3, the coefficient on the
interaction term, T2·STATE.
Table 8 presents the results. I find a significant reduction in initial SSI claim rate as a
result of the reform in Massachusetts. However, in all other states I do not find a negative
statistically significant effect. The absence of an effect in the placebo states provides some
evidence that the results presented in the main text are due to the law in Massachusetts rather
than a random fluctuation in initial SSI claim rate.

6. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper is among the first to analyze how insurance induces people to substitute between
Medicaid and SSI-disabled program. I study the 2006 Massachusetts health insurance reform to
evaluate the impact of insurance on the initial SSI claim rate. In 2006, Massachusetts introduced
legislation requiring that all state residents have health insurance coverage. I compare changes in
the initial SSI claim rate both across potential SSI-disabled applicants in Massachusetts and
between Massachusetts and other states to identify the causal effect of the law. The effect of the
law on insurance coverage makes the initial SSI claim rate decreases significantly.
A one-percentage point increase in the public health insurance predicts a 0.028
percentage point reduction in initial SSI claim rate.18 My estimate implies that the law reduced
the initial SSI claim rate by 0.098 percent. The result suggests that initial SSI claim rate is quite
sensitive to insurance status. Furthermore, I find that the reform could result in reduced
18

From column 1 of Table 4, 0.157/5.62=0.028
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expenditure for the current SSI program by encouraging potential disabled applicants not to
move onto SSI rolls. The reduction in caseload could reduce current SSI expenditures and means
that low skill workers are increasing hours of work. However, the Medicaid-only program might
provide another incentive for some disabled adults who were not previously participating in SSI
because of the stigma associated with the program. In this scenario, it could increase costs
(Yelowitz, 1998). This might already be happening through the Medically Needy (MN) program,
which in Massachusetts does not have an income limit for noninstitutionalized people with
disabilities (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003). Since the MN program has fewer covered services
under Medicaid than for categorically needy recipients, it may not provide enough incentive for
the disabled not to apply for SSI.
Finally, these results also show on one hand, that Medicaid-disabled expenditure can be
saved up to $37.45 million, which is 0.82 percent and suggest inefficiencies in Medicaiddisabled expenditure in Massachusetts. However, spending $1 on the Medicaid-disabled could
save $0.016 for individuals who get into SSI for the first time and $0.032 for individuals who
receive SSI for multiple spells. Under current budget pressures, the Medicaid expansions and
subsidies to purchase coverage mandated by the new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
the federal government may improve the ability to manage the costs of the Medicaid and SSI
programs in the future.
This project also speaks to the larger issue of the impact of insurance on welfare program
participation. While much literature has shown that insurance coverage decreases the
participation of welfare program (e.g., AFDC; SSI-aged) generally, this study provides direct
evidence that public insurance expansion may also lead potential SSI-disabled applicants to
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increase their earning level without losing Medicaid and saving the waiting time involved in a
SSI application process.
Measuring the causal impact of insurance is notoriously difficult because it requires
finding exogenous sources of variation in insurance status. The natural experiment in this paper
is a particularly relevant source of credible exogenous variation to study because it represents the
same type of insurance expansion program that recently occurred at the federal level with the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. By analyzing the impact of the Massachusetts health
reform on the initial SSI claim rate, this research contributes to the ongoing debate about the role
of health insurance subsidies and individual mandates in public policy.

Appendix for chapter 3
A. Saving on SSI expenditure calculation
Saving on SSI expenditure for considering only first spell = (Reduced initial claim
rate)*(Average allowance rate)*(Average SSI payment)*(Mean length of all first
spell)*(Massachusetts resident population). Furthermore, Saving on SSI expenditure for
considering all spells = (Reduced initial claim rate)*(Average Allowance rate)*(Average SSI
payment)*(Mean length of all spells) *(Massachusetts resident population). Rupp and Scott
(1995) show that mean length of all first SSI spells is 5.5 years; while multiple spells are
accounted for, the projected mean total pre-retirement age SSI disability stay almost doubles to
10.5 years for all awardees. SSI Annual Statistical Report (2008) shows that total SSI payment
for the disabled in 2008 is 37,245,543,000 and total recipients for ages 18-64 in 2008 are
4,947,475. Thus, I calculate average SSI payment per awardee is (37,245,543,000/4,947,475) =
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7,528. As for the allowance rate of SSI initial claim, it is 45.15 percent after taking average on all
seven states.

B. Data source
B.1. Population data ages 18-64
Calendar year

Source

2003

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2003 pp. 144-145.

2004

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2004 pp. 139-140.

2005

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2005 pp. 149-150.

2006

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2006 pp. 153-154.

2007

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2007 pp. 155-156.

2008

Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program, 2008 pp. 155-156.

B.2. Population data
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. 2011. Table 1. Preliminary Annual Estimates of the
Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to
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July 1, 2010 (NST-PEST2010-01). Available at www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NSTPEST2010-01.xls

B.3. SSI-disabled caseload data
Social Security Administration (SSA), Office of Retirement and Disability Policy (ORDP),
Office of Disability Programs (ODP), “SSA State Agency Monthly Workload Data.” Baltimore,
Maryland. Available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disability/data/SSA-SA-MOWL.xls

B.4. Medicaid data
Annual Statistical Supplement, various years. Available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/
Massachusetts Medicaid Statistics, various years. Available at
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-State/Massachusetts.html
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Table 3.1 Medicaid covered population ages 19 to 64 under MassHealth
Before health reform
After health reform
Base population
FPL
Expanded populations
Pregnant women ages
0-200%
Pregnant women ages 19 and older
19 and older
considered presumptively eligible
considered
presumptively eligible
Parents or adult
0-133%
Parents and caretaker relatives
caretaker relative
living with their
children under age 19
Disabled adults
0-133%
Disabled adults
Parents and disabled
0-133%
Non-working disabled adults
nonworking adults
Higher income adults with disabilities
working 40 hours a month or more
Long term unemployed 0-100%
Long-term unemployed individuals or
individuals
members of a couple and a client of
Department of Mental Health (DMH) and/or
receiving Emergency Aid to the Elderly,
Disabled and Children (EAEDC)**
Long-term unemployed individuals or
members of a couple, and neither a client of
DMH or receiving EAEDC**
Families receiving unemployment benefits**

FPL
0-300%

0-300%

0-133%
Above 133%
Above 133%
0-100%

0-100%

0-400%

Note: Presumptive eligibility is offered to certain children enrolled in MassHealth Standard and Family Assistance
as well as pregnant women receiving services through the MassHealth Pre-Natal program. FPL=Federal Poverty
Level.
Source: MassHealth Medicaid Section 1115 Demonstration, 2008. **Not otherwise eligible for medical assistance
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Before health Reform
Base population
Individuals living with
HIV positive
Woman under age 65
with breast or cervical
cancer

FPL
0-133%
0-250%

After health Reform
Expanded populations
Individuals living with HIV positive**

FPL
0-300%

Women eligible under the Breast and
Cervical Cancer Treatment Program
(BCCTP)
Individuals ages 19 and older with no access
to ESI, Medicare, or other subsidized health
insurance programs, including the following
groups:
(1) Low-income adults;
(2) Adults working for an employer with 50
or fewer employees who offers no insurance
or who contributes < 33% (or < 20% for
family coverage) towards insurance costs
Adults under the age of 65 who work for a
qualified small employer and purchase ESI**

0-250%

19 and 20 years olds

0-300%

(1) 0-300%;
(2) 0-300%

0-300%
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Table 3.2 Summary of Medicaid recipients
2003
2004
Treatment State
Massachusetts
Residents
%

2005

2006

2007

2008

1,042,123
6,455,028
16.14%

1,074,050
6,452,636
16.65%

1,110,475
6,453,694
17.21%

1,267,776
6,466,399
19.6%

1,448,115
6,499,275
22.28%

1,568,182
6,543,595
23.97%

Connecticut
Residents
%

496,680
3,468,319
14.32%

500,952
3,474,379
14.42%

520,660
3,477,185
14.97%

517,529
3,484,531
14.85%

518,675
3,488,084
14.87%

524,210
3,502,664
14.97%

Rhode Island
Residents
%

201,875
1,072,453
18.82%

207,621
1,075,835
19.30%

209,371
1,069,226
19.58%

212,491
1,064,193
19.97%

208,429
1,059,706
19.67%

203,731
1,058,368
19.25%

New Hampshire
Residents
%

112,044
1,282,146
8.74%

119,207
1,292,566
9.22%

120,760
1,301,050
9.28%

126,458
1,311,184
9.64%

126,074
1,316,496
9.58%

131,056
1,320,981
9.92%

154,664
616,700
25.08%

148,921
618,120
24.09%

150,836
618,797
24.38%

149,808
619,916
24.17%

157,240
620,438
25.34%

162,143
620,967
26.11%

949,741
8,585,567
11.06%

959,843
8,610,474
11.15%

965,768
8,619,564
11.20%

1,004,370
8,619,354
11.65%

1,019,936
8,630,810
11.82%

1,065,155
8,657,319
12.30%

1,721,707
12,360,988
13.93%

1,834,651
12,387,357
14.81%

1,990,466
12,415,908
16.03%

2,064,061
12,466,485
16.56%

2,181,821
12,517,701
17.43%

2,134,331
12,562,536
16.99%

Control States

Vermont
Residents
%
New Jersey
Residents
%
Pennsylvania
Residents
%

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. 2011. Table 1. Preliminary Annual Estimates of the Resident
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010 (NST-PEST201001); Medicaid data are from Annual Statistical Supplement, 2003 to 2008, Medicaid: State Data; Massachusetts
Medicaid Statistics, 2006 to 2008. The original sources are Medicaid Statistical Information System State Summary
Data and Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
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Table 3.3 Summary of initial claims of SSI ages 18 to 64
2003
2004
2005
Treatment State
Massachusetts
Residents
%

2006

2007

2008

39,645
4,089,322
0.97%

35,032
4,097,973
0.85%

35,169
4,087,881
0.86%

35,630
4,132,347
0.86%

34,935
4,157,960
0.84%

35,461
4,199,836
0.84%

14,535
2,177,308
0.67%

14,106
2,191,123
0.64%

14,278
2,201,141
0.65%

15,187
2,216,080
0.69%

15,258
2,209,809
0.69%

15,745
2,211,032
0.71%

Rhode Island
Residents
%

4,285
681,318
0.63%

4,251
686,232
0.62%

4,921
681,060
0.72%

6,126
682,193
0.90%

5,992
677,870
0.88%

6,552
674,602
0.97%

New Hampshire
Residents
%

4,602
827,282
0.56%

4,330
837,834
0.52%

4,516
843,684
0.54%

4,754
854,641
0.56%

4,812
851,900
0.56%

5,568
852,473
0.65%

Vermont
Residents
%

3001
401529
0.75%

2765
405,738
0.68%

2873
408,449
0.70%

3073
407,553
0.75%

3089
405,476
0.76%

3125
405,691
0.77%

New Jersey
Residents
%

33,129
5,382,937
0.62%

31,579
5,416,679
0.58%

29,204
5,426,768
0.54%

31,849
5,507,480
0.58%

33,114
5,487,495
0.60%

34,171
5,484,138
0.62%

Pennsylvania
Residents
%

86,447
7,632,997
1.13%

82,024
7,672,780
1.07%

84,783
7,720,030
1.10%

89,153
7,750,425
1.15%

87,284
7,756,413
1.13%

89,054
7,775,704
1.15%

Control States
Connecticut
Residents
%

Notes: Author’s calculations based on SSA and CB data.
Source: Caseload data are from SSA State Agency Monthly Workload Data; Population ages 18 to 64 data are from
Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2003 to 2008; the original sources are
Census Bureau, 2003 to 2008 resident population.
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Table 3.4 DD estimates on initial claims rate of SSI, percentage of Medicaid recipients, and SSIdisabled beneficiaries
Before After
DD
(1) SSA
(2) CMS
(3) CPS
03-04
07-08
SSI
Medicaid
SSI-disabled
6 control states
n=28
n=28
n=85,308
-0.00157*** (0.0005)
0.0562***
(0.0066)
-0.0075*** (0.002)
4 control states

2 control states

n=20
-0.00188***
n=12
-0.00094**

(0.0006)

n=20
0.06015***

(0.0004)

n=12
0.04832***

(0.005)

n=52,436
-0.007***

(0.003)

(0.009)

n=42,573
-0.0082***

(0.003)

Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. Author’s calculations are based on SSA, CB data and Annual
Statistical Supplement, 2003 to 2008.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test.
Source: (1) SSA State Agency Monthly Workload Data; (2) Annual Statistical Supplement, 2003 to 2008, Medicaid:
State Data. The original sources are Medicaid Statistical Information System State Summary Data and Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services; (3) 2005 to 2009 March Current Population Survey 19

19
Since the main matching variable, Household identification number (H_IDNUM) was renamed H_IDNUM1, and H_IDNUM2
beginning at 2004, I only use 2004 as pre-reform period for data matching consistency.
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Table 3.5 Number of TANF families meeting work requirements in recent years
TANF families
Before Deficit Reduction Act
After Deficit Reduction Act
FY 2005
FY 2006
FY 2007
FY 2008
USA
Meet work requirements
295,294
269,679
263,092
243,026
With work requirements
874,798
807,710
870,140
815,877
%
33.80
33.4
30.2
29.8
Treatment State
Massachusetts
Meet work requirements
With work requirements
%

6,624
11,061
59.9

3,818
23,699
16.1

4,110
21,616
19

14,326
31,740
45.1

Control States
Connecticut
Meet work requirements
With work requirements
%

3,154
9,262
34.1

2,446
7,913
30.9

3,014
10,443
28.9

2,187
8,667
25.2

Rhode Island
Meet work requirements
With work requirements
%

1,589
6,564
24.2

1,438
5,748
25

1,289
4,708
27.4

845
4,809
17.6

Note: TANF=Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Numbers are average monthly numbers for families
receiving TANF cash assistance. The percentages were calculated by Author.
Source: GAO-10-525 Report. The original source was from Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
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TANF families
Before Deficit Reduction Act
After Deficit Reduction Act
FY 2005
FY 2006
FY 2007
FY 2008
Control States
New Hampshire
Meet work requirements
With work requirements
%

839
3,407
24.6

787
3,269
24.1

947
2,292
41.3

780
1,662
46.9

Vermont
Meet work requirements
With work requirements
%

683
3,047
22.4

631
2,837
22.2

628
2,806
22.4

419
1,947
21.5

New Jersey
Meet work requirements
With work requirements
%

7,460
25,427
29.3

7,150
24,440
29.3

6,766
20,486
33

3,702
19,625
18.9

Pennsylvania
Meet work requirements
With work requirements
%

10,003
65,832
15.2

17,258
62,396
27.4

13,286
26,388
50.3

8,897
21,550
41.3
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Table 3.6 Summary of cancer patients ages 20 to 64
2003
2004
2005
Treatment State
Massachusetts
Residents
%

2006

2007

2008

16,186
4,089,322
0.40%

16,476
4,097,973
0.40%

16,736
4,087,881
0.41%

17,522
4,132,347
0.42%

17,741
4,157,960
0.43%

17,913
4,199,836
0.43%

Rhode Island
Residents
%

2,528
681,318
0.37%

2,741
686,232
0.40%

2,661
681,060
0.39%

2,779
682,193
0.41%

2,868
677,870
0.42%

2,831
674,602
0.42%

New Hampshire
Residents
%

3,305
827,282
0.40%

3,329
837,834
0.40%

3,434
843,684
0.41%

3,634
854,641
0.43%

3,519
851,900
0.41%

3,639
852,473
0.43%

New Jersey
Residents
%

20,689
5,382,937
0.38%

20,966
5,416,679
0.39%

21,214
5,426,768
0.39%

22,361
5,507,480
0.41%

22,832
5,487,495
0.42%

22,438
5,484,138
0.41%

Pennsylvania
Residents
%

29,865
7,632,997
0.39%

30,613
7,672,780
0.40%

31,001
7,720,030
0.40%

32,294
7,750,425
0.42%

33,233
7,756,413
0.43%

33,567
7,775,704
0.43%

Control States

Source: National Program of Cancer Registries: 1999 - 2008 Incidence, WONDER On-line Database. United States
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Cancer
Institute; 2011. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cancernpcr-v2008.html on Aug 16, 2011 9:35:24 PM; Population
ages 18 to 64 data are from Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2003 to
2008; the original sources are Census Bureau, 2003 to 2008 resident population.

95
Table 3.7 Medicaid expansion effect
Before
After
SSI
03-04
07-08
(1) DD
(2) DDD
Within
Massachusetts
n=8
n=40
-0.00098*** (0.0003)
-0.00174
(0.001)
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. Author’s calculations are based on SSA and USCS data.
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level, two-tail test.
Source: National Program of Cancer Registries: 1999 - 2008 Incidence, WONDER On-line Database. United States
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Cancer
Institute; 2011. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cancernpcr-v2008.html on Aug 16, 2011 9:35:24 PM
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Table 3.8 Placebo tests
(1)
SSI

(2)
Medicaid

(1) Massachusetts, (CT,RI,NH,VT,NJ,PA)

-0.00157***
(0.0005)

0.0562***
(0.0066)

(2) Connecticut, (MA,RI,NH,VT,NJ,PA)

-0.00023
(0.0007)

-0.0158
(0.014)

(3) Rhode Island, (CT,MA,NH,VT,NJ,PA)

0.00278***
(0.0004)

-0.0176
(0.0139)

(4) New Hampshire, (CT,RI,MA,VT,NJ,PA)

0.0000942
(0.0007)

-0.0133
(0.014)

(5) Vermont, (CT,RI,NH,MA,NJ,PA)

-0.000145
(0.0007)

-0.009
(0.0143)

(6) New Jersey, (CT,RI,NH,VT,MA,PA)

-0.00058
(0.0007)

-0.0111
(0.014)

(7) Pennsylvania, (CT,RI,NH,VT,NJ,MA)

-0.00035
(0.0007)

0.01082
(0.014)

28

28

Dependent Vars.
Treatment State, (Six Control States)

Observations

Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. Author’s calculations are based on SSA data and Annual Statistical
Supplement from 2003 to 2008.
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level, two-tail test.
** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test.
* Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test.
MA=Massachusetts; CT= Connecticut; NH= New Hampshire; NJ= New Jersey; PA= Pennsylvania; RI= Rhode
Island; VT= Vermont.

97
VITA

NAME OF AUTHOR: Chun-Chieh Hu
PLACE OF BIRTH: Tainan, Taiwan
DATE OF BIRTH: 3 October, 1980
EDUCATION:
M.S., New York University, 2008
B.S., National Chiao Tung University, 2004
B.S.M., National Chiao Tung University, 2004
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, Syracuse University, 2009-2014
Research Assistant to Professor Douglas Wolf, 2012-2013
Instructor, Syracuse University, Fall 2012
Instructor, Syracuse University, Summer 2013

